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Background
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It is difficult to believe that as recently as 2006, Eskom had profit margins averaging 12,2%. The demise of Eskom has long been coming since the late ’90s, when it became clear that to meet the electricity demand for economic development, more power plants would need to be built. Not only were the ones built by the apartheid regime – to service mostly the white population – not enough, but they were also ailing fast.
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It is difficult to believe that as recently as 2006, Eskom had profit margins averaging 12,2%. The demise of Eskom has long been coming since the late ’90s, when it became clear that to meet the electricity demand for economic development, more power plants would need to be built. Not only were the ones built by the apartheid regime – to service mostly the white population – not enough, but they were also ailing fast. In 1998, the government energy policy white paper warned that electricity demand would exceed generation capacity by 2007, due to economic and population growth. But it was already a little too late then; the candle was already melting to the tray, so to speak. The first South African power shortage, the so-called loadshedding, happened in 2008.
In 2004, the Mbeki cabinet had taken a resolution that Eskom should build new power stations. But the construction of two major power stations (Kusile and Medupi) began in 2008. Bad planning, poor technical expertise and endemic corruption within government, service providers and Eskom effected a mess that became those plants. The Swedish company that built them recently admitted to a wide string of corruption and bribes to accept below-standard material. The construction went beyond budget – three times more than the original budget – due to poor management, state capture and corruption. In 2016, the National Planning Commission reported that the cause of the inefficiencies and near collapse of national state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was chronic managerial problems due to poor policy direction, opaque funding strategies, dismal institutional accountability, politicised boards and mismanagement. When these plants began operating with the other existing plants, they were running above normal capacity to avoid more power outages. Most plants ran without proper maintenance as a means of avoiding power supply interruptions. Eventually, one by one, the plants began breaking down, causing unprecedented longer hours of loadshedding, which peaked in 2022. Other burdens on Eskom have been poor coal fleet supplied by companies associated with the state capture cabal, and theft of that coal and diesel. At times, the plants had to run on expensive diesel when coal fleet performance was below par. This plunged Eskom into a yawning debt hole.
In 2011, the government embarked on a radical renewable energy drive that was supposed to provide Eskom with at least 5 000 MW of generational power per annum. For unclear reasons, Eskom management refused to sign contracts from independent power producers. At the same time, the so-called state capture under the Jacob Zuma administration had reared its ugly head. Billions of rands were stolen; qualified people who refused to toe the corrupt line were squeezed out of Eskom. When the renewable energy bolster failed to materialise, Eskom had to intensify their maintenance programme. This necessitated taking some of its plants offline, including the overhaul of the Koeberg nuclear plant to extend its lifespan for another 20 years. Kusile had a technical fault that knocked out power production on units two and three for over two years. A reported hydrogen explosion at Medupi 4 has not been repaired since August 2021.
Solutions
Now, Eskom has had a new, qualified board and executive that are supposed to be non-captured since late 2022. It has had a separate, state-owned transmission company (National Transmission Company South Africa) since December 2021 to oversee and regulate the buying of electricity from different independent suppliers, and to plan and improve the reliability of power supply. Since 2021, new regulations are supposed to have been put into place to assist the supply of power to the national grid through independent producers. Bureaucracy and red tape are being taken down. The Eskom maintenance budget has been increased, and the recruitment drive for qualified technicians has been revamped. More power is being imported from neighbouring countries like Botswana. More generating capacity, according to Integrated Resource Plan 2019 (IRP19), is being constructed, especially from renewable energy and clean coal technology, while some dirty coal-fired power stations are being decommissioned. But most of the big coal-fired stations like Kusile and Medupi will remain, providing base load until 2030 at least. Till then, South Africa will remain on a mixed-energy plan, as outlined in the IRP19, taking advantage of the financial support for green energy as provided by European countries and the US. The finance minister has promised to take over some of Eskom’s huge debt. The remaining question now is whether all this will be enough to turn the fortunes of Eskom around. Only time will tell. The only thing certain at this stage is that if the management doesn't have the executive and political support, it will remain difficult to change anything. The naysayers are of the opinion that the rot within Eskom is irreversible, and so are gunning for the total unbundling of Eskom into a private company. Afriforum has promised to build a nuclear electricity production plant. Even if that materialises, it would take at least 30 years to complete. There's also hope that, were Elon Musk’s Tesla company to prioritise helping the country with reasonable batteries for power storage, this would take off the burden from Eskom's national base load capacity. But as it is now, renewable energy is not a feasible solution for poor households due to price factors.
Politics
In November 2021, the DPE reported having met its key performance indicators related to Eskom's unbundling, but was still struggling with its electricity reserve margin, basically meaning it had not been able to increase the utility's energy availability factor. The discussions within the ANC national conference last year regarding this, claimed that the minister of DPE, Pravin Gordhan, was at the beck and call of so-called white monopoly capital (WMC), the proponents of which want to buy cheap the rubbished and unbundled Eskom. The delegates showed their anger by not voting Gordhan into the NEC of the party, which is tantamount to throwing him into the cold. In fact, all those suspected of being at the beck and call of WMC were given the boot, a sign of the party's economic radicalisation to counteract, in particular, the populist rhetoric of the EFF.
When it was established in 1999, the mandate of the Department of Public Enterprise was to provide oversight towards increasing the utility of SOEs, even unbundling and corporatising them where required, a move that was vehemently opposed by the labour alliance partners of the ruling party. This was to make sure the SOEs are not only not a state burden, but also an effective weapon for economic development. For Eskom in particular, it was also supposed to improve its energy availability factor by providing additional capacity.
The current CEO of Eskom, Andre Marinus de Ruyter, has resigned, effective end of March, citing the loss of political support as his major reason. There was a video that went viral on social media from minister of finance Enoch Godongwana, just before the ANC conference, demonstrating that the government's executive had run out of patience with De Ruyter's excuse-ridden ineffectiveness in turning things around at Eskom. In fact, in the recent past of Eskom CEOs, De Ruyter has been the one who has enjoyed the most political support, and he was given vast leeway even when failure to deliver on his promises had become apparent. Another strange phenomenon regarding the saga of Eskom is that the minister of minerals and energy, Gwede Mantashe, seems to be the one taking the flack for Eskom's failures, even though the entity falls under the ministry of public enterprise, which has been headed by Pravin Gordhan for the past five years.
Conclusion
We are perfectly familiar with the great challenges our country faces regarding the state of corruption rot within our institutions, both public and private. Our structures of power are not just complacent or in denial of the state of rottenness in our affairs, but are active in making it worse. And the fish rots from the head, as COVID-19 to the Phala Phala saga clearly demonstrate. For anyone with eyes to see, South Africa is living on borrowed time heading towards Mzansi Spring, which the July unrest riots of the year before last gave us a taste of. The provision of reliable energy is at the centre of South Africa's ability to solve the scourge of poverty; unemployment; inequality; violent crime, including crime against women and children; and drought, which negatively affects millions of our people.
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For anyone with eyes to see, South Africa is living on borrowed time heading towards Mzansi Spring, which the July unrest riots of the year before last gave us a taste of. The provision of reliable energy is at the centre of South Africa's ability to solve the scourge of poverty; unemployment; inequality; violent crime, including crime against women and children; and drought, which negatively affects millions of our people.
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In that sense, the scourge of corruption affects us all, in both the public and private sectors. The weakening of the organs of state is what has resulted in a veritable crisis in terms of service delivery. The crisis of a stagnant economy, which results in increasing levels of poverty, and the gross mismanagement of the state-owned corporations, leading to multiple problems for the country and people, will surely lead to provocative attacks by negative forces in our midst, who will capitalise on any casus belli to sow chaos. When the institutions we serve are infiltrated by moral decay and corruption, it is then that good men are called to rise above and act with integrity and moral excellence. It is my belief that as long as one good man exists, nothing is irredeemable.
Iingxaki zikaEskom zikubaphathi
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Ayikholeleki eyokuba iziko lokwenza umbane, uEskom, ebesenza imveliso-mali engange2.2% kufutshane ngonyaka ka2006. Kodwa ke iingxaki zakhe ziqale kwa ngeminyaka ye-90s xa kubonakala ukuba uphuhliso lwakhe lombane alungeze lufezane nonyuko lwezoqoqosho nezimali nokukhula kwesizwe. Khumbula kaloku ukuba uEskom wayenzelwe nje ukufezekisa iimfuno zombane wabantu abamhlophe kuphela.
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Ayikholeleki eyokuba iziko lokwenza umbane, uEskom, ebesenza imveliso-mali engange2.2% kufutshane ngonyaka ka2006. Kodwa ke iingxaki zakhe ziqale kwa ngeminyaka ye-90s xa kubonakala ukuba uphuhliso lwakhe lombane alungeze lufezane nonyuko lwezoqoqosho nezimali nokukhula kwesizwe. Khumbula kaloku ukuba uEskom wayenzelwe nje ukufezekisa iimfuno zombane wabantu abamhlophe kuphela. Nezo zakhiwo zakhe kwangeminyaka ka1988 bese zihexa-hexa zifuna ukulungiswa okanye zigugiswe. Kuthethiwe amatyeli amaninzi ngurhulumente malunga nalo mba kwade kwaqhawuka unobathana ngomnyaka ka2008 xa into yokuphela okanye ukunciphiswa kwezinga lokusetyenziswa kombane ekuthiwa yiLoadshedding iqala.
Ulawulo lukamongameli uThabo Mbeki lugqibe ngonyaka ka2004 ukuba makwakhiwe amanye amaziko okwenza umbane afana neKusile neMedupi. Ingxaki nolwakhiwo lelokuba lwenziwa ngokungxama, kusetyenziswa abantu abanganalwazi ncam lwale nto bayenzayo kwadibana norhwaphilizo yangumbhodamo. Oko kukhokhele ekubeni abehexehexe la maziko angakwazi ukwenza mbane ncam, kwabe ke phofu kubhatalwe izigidi ngezigidi ngazo. Eyona ibe mbi mpela lurhwaphilizo oluthe lwenzeka phakathi kwabakhi bakwaHitachi nombutho woburhulumente oyiANC ngengalo yayo yezophuhliso oyiChancellor House. Konke oku kukhokhelele kwinto ekuthiwa yi State Capture (ukurhwaphilizwa nokubanjwa kombuso ngobhongwane ngabathile abasondelene norhulumente) ngexesha loburhulumente obuphantsi kukamongameli uZuma othe wanyanzelisa uEskom ukuba asebenzisane namashishini abucala malunga nokufumana amanye amalahle. La mashishini, amanye awo ayephethwe lusapho lakwaGupta amrhuqele eludakeni ngamandla uEskom ngokushishina ngamalahle akudidi oluphantsi gqithi. Yonke le nto ikhokhelele ekubeni zicime zicima izibane kuEskom ngenxa yokumoshakala kwamaziko abo okwenza umbane, okwakusoyanyaniswa nohlobo lwamalahle aludidi oluphantsi. Ezi zinto azilwenzanga nje ingxwelerha kuphela iziko likaEskom koko ikhokhelele ekudubadubekeni kwezothutho noqoqosho kwilizwe lonke laseMzantsi Africa.
Abasebenzi abaninzi abanesakhono kwaEskom bahamba ngelithuba bediniwe kukungcoliswa ngorhwaphilizo ngokokutsho kwabo, noxa kuyabonakala ngoku ukuba abanye babo baphela bethatha imihlala-phantsi baphinda bayokusebenza kwamanye amaziko azimeleyo enza umbane. Uninzi lwabo lwaba yinxalenye yokulimaza uEskom ngorhwaphilizo ngokuya kumaziko afana noHitachi apho babuya baqashwa kwizikhundla ezifana noba ezilingana nezo babekuzo kwaEskom. Abanye ngoku bayinxalenye yamaziko azimeleyo afuna ukuthengisela uEskom umbane ococekileyo obizwa njengeRenewables. Yenye ingxaki ajongene nayo urhulumente lena ityhola iququbelana labasaya kuba ngabasebenzi bakaEskom ngokuququzelela ukufa kwakhe ukuze bona bavele mva bengabahlanguli nabathengi beli ziko ngeemali eziphantsi. Baninzi kumaqela ezepolitiki eziphikisayo abafuna uEskom asuswe ezandleni zikarhulumente azimele ngokuthengwa ngoosomashishini abakhulu. Yenye yezinto eyenza ungquzulwano nokubethabethana kwentetha eMzantsi Africa kuba umbutho olawulayo wona oyiANC umile kwinto yokuba imeko yokuphuhlisa umbane elizweni nguEskom kufuneka iphathwe phantsi komthetho wemeko yeState of Disaster njengelaa xesha lesifo esosulelayo ekuthiwa yiCovid-19. Ixhala labahlali abaninzi baseMzantsi kukuba le nkqubo yongxunguphalo lwelizwe iza kuphinda ibe phantsi koMinister uNkosazana Zuma weCOGTA owabonakalisa iimpawu zokuba nguzwi lakhe Ngelaa xesha leCovid-19. Abantu abaninzi abanangxaki kakhulu neState of Disaster ukuba uya kube setshintshiwe uMinister Zuma kweso sikhundla, nditsho mna kwa umbutho omkhulu ophikisayo kwezepolitiki iDA.
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Yiyo kuphela indlela enokukwazi ukusikhupha kula manyundululu orhwaphilizo kulungiswe eli ziko uEskom aphuhlise isizwe, azise impilo engcono kwabo babetheka kakhulu yintlupheko nokulamba.
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Ithemba likaEskom ngoku kukupheliswa korhwaphilizo. Yiyo le nto enesigqeba (board) esitsha, kwenyuswe neemali zokuqasha abantu abanesakhono, nezo kulungisa amaziko okwenza umbane ngamalahle acocekileyo. Kodwa kuse kude entanjeni kuba enye into erhuqela uEskom eludakeni lokruthwa-kruthwano phakathi kwabaphathi norhulumente, abalwa ngezikhundla neendawo zokwenza izavenge zemali ngorhulumente. Nditsho kwa into yokuba eli ziko likaEskom malibe kweyiphi iMinistry yintsuma-ntsumane phakathi kukamnumzana uGwede Mantanshe (Mineral Resources and Energy) okanye ekaPravin Gordhan (Public Enterprise). Kwintlanganiso yeANC yokonyula iinkokheli zalo mbutho ezintsha uMantashe ubonakele njengokumthwalisi sitshapha somongameli owaye waphumelela kwakhona onguCyril Ramaphosa. Into efika ithi ezikaGordhan iintsuku zibaliwe kuba khange alenze ixesha nasekungeneni kwiNational Executive Committee yayo. Amehlo onke akumongameli welizwe kule veki sijonge kuyo ukuba uza kuyihlukuhla ayiyondelelanise kanjani iCabinet yakhe. Kodwa amarhe wona athi iinkokheli ezifana neSekela Mongameli uDD Mabuza, ooMinister Nkosazana Zuma, Pravin Gordhan, Nathi Mthethwa ingathi abaz' ukulenza ixesha. Kwanga kungangeniswa iinkokheli eziza kujonga amalungelo abantu ngaphandle korhwaphilizo. Yiyo kuphela indlela enokukwazi ukusikhupha kula manyundululu orhwaphilizo kulungiswe eli ziko uEskom aphuhlise isizwe, azise impilo engcono kwabo babetheka kakhulu yintlupheko nokulamba.
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