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One of the most insightful academics I’ve come across as a scholar of international politics is the Stanford-based economist and social theorist, Thomas Sowell. Relating an incident when he was an undergraduate student at Harvard and, at the time, an inveterate socialist, Sowell recalls his economics professor asking him which policy he favoured on a range of pertinent and contemporary issues. With great vigour, Sowell made a case for the particular policy he favoured and the benefits likely to follow should it be adopted by government. Sowell’s professor, Professor Arthur Smithies of Harvard, retorted with a question that took the young Thomas Sowell by surprise: “And then what will happen?” As Sowell recalls, the question quickly led him to realise that the actualisation of his policy preferences would lead to other expected and unexpected consequences. As Sowell carefully considered and then outlined these consequences, Professor Smithies persisted with this line of questioning: “And what will happen after that?” And: “And then what will happen?” The lesson Sowell is trying to impart is an apt one: in economics, as in politics, “[m]ost thinking stops at stage one”.

Sowell’s account of the dangers and limitations of stage-one thinking also has bearing on the Israel-Gaza War, particularly with reference to the oft touted two-state solution. This “solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains very popular – among politicians and the public at large (in South Africa and abroad) – and is often presented as a viable path to lasting peace, security and liberty for the Palestinian people and the region as a whole. Experts on the Middle East and scholars of international relations are, however, much more circumspect in their analysis of the viability of the two-state solution, yet the weight of expert opinion is slanted toward the idea that the creation of two independent states is a viable and desirable objective. When asked by the authoritative journal Foreign Affairs to respond (by either “strongly agreeing”, “agreeing”, being “neutral”, “disagreeing” or “strongly disagreeing”) to the statement, “The two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer viable,” some 11 experts “strongly agreed”, 11 “agreed”, six remained “neutral”, 30 “disagreed” and 12 “strongly disagreed”. Evidently, while expert opinion on the two-state solution is decidedly mixed, there remains yet strong conviction that the two-state solution is a viable path for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict and, concomitantly, bringing peace.

I have deep reservations about the viability of the two-state solution. My reservations have nothing to do with whether I support this or that party in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It also has nothing to do with the question of whether it is or is not the right thing to do to support the two-state solution. My question turns on the lesson imparted above, ie, “And then what will happen?” In short, while one undoubtedly can and does appreciate the moral imperative driving the support for an independent Palestinian state, I am particularly concerned about the costs and consequences of such a solution, which ultimately the least vulnerable (ie, civilians, not politicians) will have to bear. Again, while moral aspirations are all well and good, the realist in me is deeply concerned about the unintended – and at the same time, scarcely considered – consequences of the actualisation of the two-state solution. What are the principal concerns?

On internal and external grounds, I believe that the two-state solution will make things worse – for everyone (ie, Israelis and Palestinians) and for the region as a whole. Importantly, it is worth mentioning that the term “solution” obscures the reality that in well-near every political and economic transaction, there are also costs and consequences to bear or, at the very least, consider. As Thomas Sowell notes, “There are no solutions. There are only trade-offs.” Let us first consider the internal dimension, ie, the question of whether Palestinians would be better off in an independent Palestinian state? Answering this question really depends on what type of government would take root in a Palestinian state and who would be voted into power (if, of course, a vote occurred). The easy, yet unhelpful, response would be that the type of government and the choice of ruling party would be up to the Palestinian people to decide. Here, one would do well to remember that a substantial part of the population (in the Gaza Strip and West Bank) supports Hamas, having voted it into power in 2006. Indeed, while Palestinians should decide their own government in an envisioned Palestinian state, I very much doubt that such a government would endorse and protect the liberal democratic values that supporters of the two-state solution envision will take root subsequent to the creation of a Palestinian state. Again, while the Palestinians are free to choose how they construct and reconstruct their own society, I cannot see that such an undertaking will be conducted along liberal democratic lines. While free from the bondage of Israel, Palestinians living in an independent Palestinian state, I fear, will suffer the bondage imposed by Hamas or their ilk. Palestinian freedom will not take the form of what supporters of the two-state solution envision. I also very much doubt whether the building of a modern society would be high on the agenda of any government established in an independent Palestinian state. It is worth mentioning here that, irrespective of the billions of dollars of aid given to the current Hamas-led government, building critical infrastructure and creating a modern and vibrant society have not been particularly high on the agenda. Moreover, given the external realities mentioned below, I further seriously doubt that building a vibrant and modern society is likely to preoccupy the minds of the government of an envisioned Palestinian state.

On external grounds (ie, with reference to an independent Palestinian state’s interstate relations), I fear that the consequences following from the adoption of the two-state solution would be even worse. In short, will an independent Palestinian state increase or decrease the prospects of war in the region? In my assessment, two states, each armed to the teeth, will find it difficult to abstain from war. Rather than pacifying the prospect of war between Israelis and Palestinians (specifically here, a Palestinian state), the two-state solution will make war more likely. One can, of course, say that war is already part and parcel of Israeli and Palestinian lives. This, however, misses the point. The crucial difference between war today and war in the future (ie, war between Israel and an independent Palestinian state) is that both parties will be armed to the teeth, with an independent Palestinian state likely to receive increased Iranian support (in quantity and quality of weapons). Whereas Iranian military support of Hamas and their ilk in the Gaza Strip is today deemed illegal in some quarters, such support will be deemed legal should an independent Palestinian state take root. Accordingly, an independent Palestinian state is likely to boast a military capability dwarfing that possessed by Hamas today. Such a war will be more severe than anything we have seen before in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But could Israel and an independent Palestinian state not live in peace, co-existing as neighbours? Two reasons make such a prospect highly unlikely. The first reason relates to the particular nature of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian peoples. It hardly needs mentioning that the relationship is one fraught with hostility and distrust. In international politics, pairs of states with dissimilar economic, political, cultural and social values and institutions often find it difficult to mend fences. Through much effort, such differences can be pushed aside, and states can learn to live with each other, although co-existence does not necessarily suggest friendship between them. Where a deeply hurtful and tragic history between peoples exists and where the bitterness runs deep (as in the case of Israel and Palestine), mending fences becomes inordinately difficult. Relations between Israel and an independent Palestinian state are likely to bear the marks of its very difficult and hurtful past – and will undoubtedly influence the future trajectory of relations between Israel and an envisioned Palestinian state. Importantly, feelings of bitterness and grievances, coupled with the contention (shared by some in the region) that the existence of a Jewish state should be crushed (hence, as is often stated and sung, Israel should be pushed “from the river to the sea”), will likely ignite strong nationalistic fervour in an independent Palestinian state. As the history of international politics indicates, nationalism is a potent driver of war. Iran is likely to add fuel to the nationalistic fire that will presumably burn in an independent Palestinian state. Given Iran’s stated objectives to wipe Israel off the map, coupled with its ambitions to become the dominant regional power, there are good reasons to believe that Iran will ramp up its support of those desiring to see the Jewish state crushed. Accordingly, Iran will continue to sow the seeds that the Jewish state is a problem to be dealt with, because it ultimately serves its vision for and interests in the region. Strong nationalist fervour in an independent Palestinian state, grounded in the notion that the Palestinian peoples have endured a protracted time of humiliation, is likely to persist, thwarting the prospects of interstate peace. Likewise, faced with a neighbour with which a bitter history is shared, and given the fears of being surrounded by enemies, Israel’s arguments for the necessity to protect itself at all costs will become even more powerful.

While nationalism as a potent driver of war constitutes the first reason undermining the prospect of interstate peace, the second reason working against peace is overwhelmingly structural in nature. In essence, one of those old yet enduring concepts of realist explanations of international politics is apt here, notably, the security dilemma. In John Herz’s classic formulation of the term, the concept “security dilemma” refers to the condition in which states’ insecurity about each other’s current and future intentions leads each to arm for the sake of providing for their own security, thus unleashing a vicious armament-rearmament cycle. Importantly, as structural realist scholar of international politics Kenneth Waltz has noted, the condition of insecurity is not produced by the will of the respective states, but by the condition of insecurity in which they (as well as all other states) operate. There being no overarching and all-powerful agency or institution at the international political level to provide for states’ security, both Israel and an independent Palestinian state would be constrained to arm for their security, thus rendering each state even less secure and more desperate to rearm. In the case of both Israel and an independent Palestinian state, other states (notably, the United States of America and Iran) would be all too willing to send more weapons to aid Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of insecurity. What compounds matters in the case of Israel and an independent Palestinian state is the very fact that the uncertainty likely to be experienced by each is deepened by the deep distrust and animosity likely to take hold and then persist between these states. On grounds of the structural and domestic (nationalist) forces likely to constrain future Israel-Palestine relations, the prospect of interstate peace in the wake of the two-state solution looks bleak.

I have offered several reasons outlining why I contend that the two-state solution is likely to be fraught with (unintended) consequences, which together will make the prospects of peace – and, importantly, liberty and equality – even the more unlikely. No solution is implicated in the notion of a two-state “solution” – only a trade-off, one with dangerous consequences. Unfortunately, stage-one thinking on this as well as other issues continues to be in vogue.

Eben Coetzee, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State

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