Abstract
State fragility and alternatively governed spaces are closely interconnected phenomena that increasingly characterise contemporary conflict in parts of Africa. This article examines this relationship through a comparative analysis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. It argues that deficiencies in state capacity, institutional effectiveness, and political legitimacy prevent governments from exercising effective authority across their sovereign territories. These governance deficits create political and security vacuums that enable non-state actors (NSAs) to establish themselves as de facto authorities. Rather than viewing these regions as “ungoverned spaces”, the article adopts the more accurate perspective that they are governed, but often through alternative political and security structures established by armed groups, insurgents, militias, or hybrid authorities.
The DRC and Mozambique offer valuable comparative case studies because, despite their distinct historical trajectories, they exhibit important structural similarities. In both countries, violent conflict is concentrated in peripheral regions historically characterised by limited state presence, weak administrative capacity, and poor service delivery. In the DRC, conflict has persisted for decades in the eastern provinces, while in Mozambique the insurgency is centred in Cabo Delgado. In both cases, violence intensified where governments failed to provide security, effective governance, and meaningful socio-economic development.
Another important similarity concerns the economic geography of these conflicts. Both regions are richly endowed with natural resources, which have become closely linked to violence. Eastern DRC possesses substantial deposits of gold, cobalt, coltan and other strategic minerals that finance armed groups. Cabo Delgado contains some of Africa’s largest offshore natural gas reserves. Although the resource bases differ, both demonstrate how valuable natural resources intensify competition for territorial control and contribute to the persistence of conflict.
Important differences nevertheless exist in the economic foundations of insurgent activity. Armed groups in eastern DRC, particularly the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the March 23 Movement (M23), have systematically captured mining areas and illicit trading networks, financing prolonged military campaigns through the extraction and illegal trade of minerals. In contrast, Ansar al-Sunna (also known as Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah) in Mozambique has not relied on direct control of natural gas production, but rather on regional criminal activities, including smuggling, drug trafficking and other illicit economic networks. In both cases, however, armed organisations are sustained not only by political or ideological objectives but also by strong economic incentives.
Both conflicts also display a significant regional dimension. Cross-border movements of fighters, weapons, finances and illicit goods have linked them to neighbouring states and complicated efforts to restore stability. Consequently, regional organisations and international partners have become increasingly involved through multinational military interventions and security cooperation. The transnational nature of these conflicts illustrates both the necessity of regional responses and the limitations of purely domestic policy approaches.
The humanitarian consequences have been severe. Violence against civilians, mass displacement, destruction of livelihoods, and prolonged insecurity have produced humanitarian crises with national, regional, and international implications. Civilian populations have borne the greatest burden, while governments have struggled to restore security or establish conditions conducive to long-term development.
The comparative analysis further demonstrates that both conflicts reflect deeper governance failures associated with weak state legitimacy. Governments are widely perceived as being unable to provide security, justice, public services, and economic opportunities. Political elites are often viewed as distant, unresponsive, or indifferent to local concerns. Such conditions create opportunities for insurgent organisations to exploit social marginalisation, political exclusion, and local grievances. While some groups rely primarily on coercion and intimidation, others also seek legitimacy by offering alternative forms of governance or ideological mobilisation.
The findings strongly support the proposition that state fragility and alternatively governed spaces reinforce one another. Weak governance creates opportunities for armed NSAs to emerge, while their continued presence further erodes state institutions and undermines governmental authority. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle in which state weakness facilitates insurgency, and insurgency further deepens state fragility.
Eastern DRC provides one of the clearest examples of this dynamic. Since the early 1990s, successive governments in Kinshasa have struggled to exercise effective authority over large parts of the eastern provinces. Weak military capacity, limited administrative reach, and persistent governance failures have enabled numerous armed groups to establish durable political and military structures. Over time, these organisations have developed sophisticated systems of territorial control, economic exploitation, and political influence that have become embedded within local governance arrangements.
Many of these organisations employ systematic violence to consolidate territorial control and secure access to valuable resources. Intimidation, attacks on civilians, forced displacement, and other forms of coercion have become defining features of the conflict. The close relationship between mineral wealth and armed violence has further entrenched instability. Organisations such as the FDLR and M23 demonstrate how access to mineral resources provides sustainable revenue streams that finance military operations over extended periods. Illegal mining, smuggling, and cross-border commercial networks have become integral components of the conflict economy. As long as these financial structures remain intact, breaking the cycle of violence will remain extremely difficult. External actors and regional interests further reinforce these dynamics, highlighting the broader international dimensions of the conflict.
Mozambique exhibits many comparable characteristics despite important contextual differences. The situation in Cabo Delgado, one of the country’s most marginalised provinces, has become one of Southern Africa’s most serious security crises. Decades of inadequate public investment, poor service delivery, widespread poverty, and political and economic exclusion created favourable conditions for the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna. Many local communities perceived themselves as having been excluded from the anticipated benefits of major natural gas developments, while political and economic power remained concentrated in southern Mozambique.
Within this environment, Ansar al-Sunna successfully exploited local grievances to establish itself as a significant insurgent movement. Combining ideological mobilisation with coercion and violence, the organisation attracted support from some marginalised communities while intimidating others into submission. The state’s inability to provide security, governance and economic opportunities significantly contributed to the insurgency’s expansion. Although Mozambique has received considerable military assistance from regional organisations and international partners, the insurgency has proved resilient. Continued insecurity has also delayed major natural gas projects that were expected to play a transformative role in Mozambique’s economic development.
The comparative analysis contributes to broader debates on sovereignty and political authority by demonstrating that states are no longer the exclusive providers of governance and security in many conflict-affected regions. Where governments fail to exercise effective territorial control, NSAs increasingly establish alternative systems of political, military and economic authority. Sovereignty should therefore be understood not only as a legal principle but also as a state’s practical capacity to govern effectively throughout its territory.
Overall, the comparison demonstrates that limited statehood remains a principal driver of protracted insecurity, insurgency and political instability in parts of Africa. Weak governance, inadequate security, poor public service delivery, and persistent socio-economic exclusion have created conditions in which armed NSAs continue to flourish. Military responses alone have consistently proved inadequate because they do not address the structural governance deficits that sustain insurgent mobilisation.
Ultimately, durable peace and long-term stability in both the DRC and Mozambique will depend on strengthening state legitimacy, extending effective governance into peripheral regions, improving public service delivery, reducing political and economic exclusion, and restoring the state’s capacity to exercise authority throughout its territory. Unless these structural governance challenges are addressed, alternatively governed spaces are likely to persist, allowing armed non-state actors to remain influential political and security actors while continuing to undermine national, regional and international security.
Keywords: Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mozambique; non-state actors (NSAs); power vacuums; state fragility; ungoverned spaces
- This article’s featured image was created by Dan Galvani Sommavilla and obtained from Pexels.