Litnet

• Read the English version of this article here.
  
• Hierdie artikel is gebaseer op die 2012 LitNet Akademies (Regte)-artikel, “Eiendomsverlies deur verkrygende verjaring: Onteiening sonder vergoeding – of nie?” deur AJ van der Walt en EJ Marais.

1. Inleiding

Met sy verkiesing tot ANC-president in Desember 2017 het adjunkpresident Cyril Ramaphosa aangekondig dat die party ’n resolusie aanvaar het ingevolge waarvan grondhervorming versnel gaan word deur grond sonder vergoeding te onteien. Dit moet wel op so ’n wyse gedoen word dat dit nie landbouproduktiwiteit, voedselsekerheid of die ekonomie mag benadeel nie. Vervolgens is daar vrae oor wat dit presies gaan behels. Hierdie meningstuk neem twee kwessies onder die loep, naamlik (i) die betekenis van onteiening en (ii) hoe die vasstelling van vergoeding vir onteiening ingevolge die Grondwet tans daar uitsien. In laasgenoemde konteks, wat die hooffokus van die stuk is, word daar ook gekyk na die (on)wenslikheid van onteiening sonder vergoeding.

Voordat hierdie vrae ontleed word, word die nodige agtergrond eers geskets.

2. Agtergrond

Ná 24 jaar van demokrasie is daar steeds miljoene Suid-Afrikaners wat onvoldoende of geen toegang tot grond het nie. Dit behels ’n tweeledige probleem: hierdie mense het nie geskikte behuising nie, wat hul menswaardigheid ondermyn, en daarby het hulle nie toegang tot die welvaartskeppende eienskappe wat grond bied nie. Onteiening kan ’n sleutelrol speel om hierdie ongeregtighede aan te spreek.

Bondig gestel behels onteiening ’n staatsbevoegdheid waarvolgens eiendom op ’n gedwonge wyse teen vergoeding van eienaars verkry kan word. Die staat het nie die afgelope 24 jaar hierdie bevoegdheid werklik gebruik om grondhervorming te verwesenlik nie. Een van die redes hiervoor is die regering se “gewillige koper, gewillige verkoper”-beleid wat gevolg is om plaaslike en buitelandse beleggersvertroue te help verseker. Sodanige beleid het grondhervorming vertraag omdat grondeienaars nie noodwendig gewillig was om hul grond aan die staat te verkoop nie. Daarbenewens kon hulle teoreties enige prys vra (insluitend kunsmatig hoë pryse) om hul eiendom aan die staat te verkoop, aangesien ’n gewillige verkoper (die persoon by wie die staat, as die gewillige koper, die eiendom wil koop) nie tot die markwaarde van die eiendom beperk is nie. Indien die regering, as gewillige koper, nie wilsooreenstemming met die verkoper kon bereik nie, kon grond nie bekom word nie. Onteiening sou ’n reuseverskil in hierdie konteks kon maak omdat dit nie die toestemming van grondeienaars vereis nie. Daarby hoef die vergoedingsbedrag slegs regverdig en billik te wees, wat – selfs indien dit teen markwaarde is – waarskynlik laer sal wees as die prys wat ’n gewillige verkoper in baie gevalle sou wou hê. Om beswaar te maak teen die vergoedingsbedrag kan nie die onteieningsproses keer nie. ’n Eienaar wat onteien is en ongelukkig met die vergoedingsbedrag is, het geen ander keuse nie as om sy of haar eiendom prys te gee en die bedrag in ’n geregshof te betwis, wat dan sal bepaal of die bedrag regverdig en billik is. 

3. Die onteieningsbegrip

Onteiening is ’n oeroue begrip wat al deel gevorm het van die Romeinse reg meer as 2 000 jaar gelede. Die apartheidsregering het ook hierdie bevoegdheid gehad. Vandag ontleen die staat sy onteieningsbevoegdheid aan artikel 25(2)–(4) van die Grondwet, gelees met die Onteieningswet 63 van 1975. In soverre die Grondwet en hierdie wet nie strook nie, geniet die grondwetlike bepalings voorkeur. Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet bepaal dat onteiening net ingevolge ’n algemeen geldende regsvoorskrif mag plaasvind vir ’n openbare doel of in die openbare belang teen vergoeding wat regverdig en billik is. “Openbare doel” sluit doelwitte soos die bou van paaie, hospitale en skole in (die sogenaamde tradisionele doelwitte waarvoor eiendom gewoonlik onteien word). Wat “openbare belang” betref, bepaal artikel 25(4)(a) dat dit die nasie se verbintenis tot grondhervorming insluit, asook “hervormings om billike toegang tot al Suid-Afrika se natuurlike hulpbronne te bewerkstellig”. Onteiening behels dus gewoonlik die gedwonge verkryging van eiendom deur die staat, dit wil sê sonder die eienaar se toestemming of medewerking, teen vergoeding. Die staat hoef nie altyd die uiteindelike eienaar van die eiendom te wees nie; privaat persone, soos die begunstigdes van ’n grondhervormingsprogram (veral die herverdelingsprogram) kan ook die uiteindelike eienaars daarvan wees. Die staat kan dus nie sy vergoedingsplig omseil deur byvoorbeeld in hierdie konteks aan te voer dat die verkryging van eiendom deur private persone nie op staatsverkryging daarvan neerkom nie.

Die rede waarom onteiening vergoed word, is tweeledig, naamlik:

(i) om ongelyke behandeling van persone voor die gereg te voorkom (gewoonlik is daar slegs een eienaar of ’n klein groepie eienaars wat deur ’n spesifieke onteiening geraak word, maar waaruit die breër gemeenskap dan voordeel trek)

(ii) ten einde die onteiende party in die posisie te plaas waarin hy of sy sou wees indien die onteiening nie plaasgevind het nie. Die vergoeding dien dus as plaasvervanger vir die eiendom wat die staat verkry.

4. Die vergoedingskwessie

 4.1      Die vasstelling van regverdige en billike vergoeding

Die “gewillige koper, gewillige verkoper”-beleid kom nêrens in artikel 25 (die eiendomsklousule) voor nie. Hierdie benadering was, soos reeds genoem, regeringsbeleid wat gevolg is om beleggers te paai. Artikel 25(2)–(3) van die Grondwet vereis die betaling van regverdige en billike vergoeding aan onteiende persone. Daarbenewens moet die vergoedingsbedrag ook “’n billike ewewig toon tussen die openbare belang en die belange van diegene wat geraak word”.

Daar word dikwels aangevoer dat die vergoedingsvereiste grondhervorming ondermyn, en wel om twee redes. Enersyds maak dit grondhervorming (klaarblyklik) onbekostigbaar omdat die staat elke keer markwaarde vir eiendom moet betaal. Andersyds is dit onbillik indien grondeienaars, van wie vele steeds wit is en deur apartheid bevoordeel is, vir ’n tweede keer bevoordeel word wanneer hul eiendom teen markwaarde onteien word.

Die eerste argument berus op twee veronderstellings, naamlik dat markwaarde altyd betaalbaar is vir onteiening, en dat die betaling hiervan grondhervorming onbekostigbaar maak. Die Grondwet vereis betaling van regverdige en billike vergoeding, nie vergoeding teen markwaarde nie. Derhalwe hoef die uiteindelike vergoedingsbedrag nie noodwendig gelyk aan markwaarde te wees nie.

Artikel 25(3) sit vyf faktore uiteen wat in ag geneem moet word wanneer vergoeding vasgestel word. Hulle lui as volg (hierdie bespreking is merendeels gebaseer op AJ van der Walt se Constitutional property law (3de uitgawe, 2011), ble 503–20 en A Gildenhuys se Onteieningsreg (2de uitgawe, 2001), ble 170–9):

(a) Die huidige gebruik van die eiendom. Hierdie faktor is waarskynlik relevant by die onteiening van skaars hulpbronne (soos stedelike grond waar behuising dringend benodig word of geskikte landbougrond vir opkomende boere) wat nie produktief gebruik word nie. Die blote feit dat eiendom nie produktief gebruik word nie, behoort egter nie sonder meer tot ’n vermindering van vergoeding te lei nie. So ’n benadering mag daarop neerkom dat die eienaar gestraf word, wat sal beteken dat die onteiening nie in die openbare belang is nie en daarom ongeldig sou wees. Nietemin, eiendomsreg verleen nie net regte aan eienaars met betrekking tot hoe hulle met hul eiendom mag omgaan nie; dit behels ook verpligtinge. Hierdie beskouing vind steun in die feit dat die vergoedingsbedrag ’n billike ewewig moet toon tussen die belange van die onteiende party en die openbare belang. Dit sou daarop kon dui dat eiendomsgebruike wat werklik moreel en sosiaal onaanvaarbaar in die samelewing is (soos eienaars van geboue in die Johannesburgse middestad wat vir jare nie daarna omgesien het nie en toegelaat het dat dit verval), ’n afwaartse aanpassing van die vergoedingsbedrag kan regverdig, veral indien dit broodnodige behuising van hawelose mense ontneem.

(b) Die geskiedenis van die verkryging en gebruik van die eiendom. Indien die staat eiendom teen afslag (of selfs gratis) verkry het, wat in vele gevalle tydens apartheid gebeur het, en dit dan aan ’n wit boer geskenk of teen afslag verkoop het, sal dit onregverdig wees as die staat nou markwaarde vir die eiendom betaal indien dieselfde boer steeds die eienaar is. Dit is egter onseker wat die uitkoms van hierdie faktor gaan wees indien die aanvanklike boer die grond intussen verkoop het aan iemand wat volle markwaarde daarvoor betaal het. Dit is onduidelik of die nuwe eienaar met minder as markwaarde tevrede behoort te wees bloot omdat die aanvanklike verkryging van die grond op ’n onregverdige wyse geskied het, veral omdat dit geargumenteer sou kon word dat grond dikwels in Suid-Afrika (ten minste aanvanklik) op ’n wyse bekom is wat, ten minste moreel beskou, twyfelagtig is.

(c) Die markwaarde van die eiendom. Markwaarde moet onderskei word van die prys waarteen ’n gewillige verkoper bereid is om eiendom te verkoop. Markwaarde word meestal vasgestel deur middel van die sogenaamde vergelykbare-verkope-metode), waarvolgens daar gekyk word na die pryse waarteen grond van soortgelyke grootte in dieselfde omgewing oor ’n sekere tyd verkoop is. Gevolglik mag markwaarde laer wees as die waarde wat ’n gewillige verkoper vir eiendom in die ope mark sou kry.

(d) Die omvang van regstreekse belegging en subsidie deur die staat ten opsigte van die verkryging en voordelige kapitaalverbetering van die eiendom. Hierdie oorweging is in baie opsigte soortgelyk aan faktor (b) hier bo. Die probleem is, weer eens, watter rol dit sou speel indien die huidige grondeienaar markwaarde vir die grond betaal het en dus nie direk gebaat het by die belegging en subsidie deur die staat nie.

(e) Die doel van die onteiening. Hierdie oorweging moet onderskei word van die grondslag (dws die openbare doel of belang) waarop eiendom onteien word en wat die onteiening dus regverdig. Elmien du Plessis (in haar hoofstuk wat in B Hoops ea (reds) se Rethinking expropriation law I – Public interest in expropriation (2015) verskyn) redeneer dat dit geregverdig sou wees om ’n vergoedingsbedrag benede markwaarde toe te ken indien die onteiening op ’n transformatiewe of sosialegeregtigheidsdoel gerig is. Dit is veral so, voer sy aan, indien vergoeding teen markwaarde sodanige doel onbekostigbaar maak (ek keer terug na hierdie argument onder die volgende hofie hier onder). In die afwesigheid van duidelike riglyne oor hoe vergoeding in hierdie konteks vasgestel moet word, mag dit egter tot onvoorspelbaarheid en inkonsekwentheid in die regspleging lei. So mag een regter die vergoedingsbedrag met 17% verminder (soos wat die Grondeisehof in die Msiza-saak in 2016 gedoen het), terwyl ’n ander dit, argumentsonthalwe, met 80% mag verminder. Dit sou dus wenslik wees indien die parlement duidelikheid in hierdie verband skep, aangesien die Onteieningswetsontwerp van 2016 (weergawe B4D-2015) geen woord hieroor rep nie. Dit is noemenswaardig dat die Hoogste Hof van Appèl in 2017, in die appèl tot die Msiza-uitspraak, bevind het dat dit ontoelaatbaar is om die vergoedingsbedrag te verminder bloot omdat die doel op grondhervorming gerig is. (Die saak word tans na die Konstitusionele Hof geappelleer, derhalwe mag ons binnekort bindende regspraak omtrent hierdie vraagstuk kry.)

Ter opsomming: die vergoedingsbedrag hang van die spesifieke omstandighede van elke geval af en sal daarom nie noodwendig altyd gelyk aan markwaarde wees nie. Die Konstitusionele Hof volg ’n sogenaamde tweestap-benadering waarvolgens die markwaarde van die eiendom eers vasgestel word en daar dan na die ander faktore in artikel 25(3) gekyk word om te bepaal of die vergoedingsbedrag dan afwaarts of opwaarts aangepas moet word. Sommige skrywers en regters meen dat hierdie benadering markwaarde onregverdiglik tot die belangrikste faktor in artikel 25(3) verhef. Dit is wel moeilik om in te sien waarom ’n grondeienaar met minder as markwaarde tevrede behoort te wees indien geen van die ander faktore ’n verlaging regverdig nie. Met ander woorde, daar mag gevalle wees (dit mag uiteindelik blyk selfs die norm te wees) waar die betaling van vergoeding teen markwaarde sal plaasvind. Hierdie veronderstelling is nie noodwendig omstrede nie, aangesien buitelandse regstelsels, soos die Duitse reg, Europese Unie-reg, Australiese reg en Ierse reg, ’n soortgelyke benadering volg.

Dit bring ons by die vraag of die betaling van vergoeding teen markwaarde grondhervorming werklik onbekostigbaar maak. Hier is die November 2017-verslag van die ANC se “High level panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change”, onder voorsitterskap van voormalige president Kgalema Motlanthe, insiggewend. Dit noem dat slegs 0,4% van die nasionale begroting aan grondhervorming gewy word, met minder as 0,1% wat aan grondherverdeling (wat argumentshalwe die belangrikste program is wanneer dit by armoedeverligting kom) gewy is. Dit noem ook dat die vergoedingsvereiste by onteiening nie die “most serious constraint on land reform in South Africa to date” is nie. Ander probleme, soos korrupte staatsamptenare, die kanalisering van die grondhervormingsbegroting na lede van die politieke elite, ’n gebrek aan politieke wil en ’n gebrek aan opleiding en kapasiteit, word gelys as dié dinge wat grondhervorming werklik kniehalter. Daar is ook bevind dat die staat nie sy onteieningsbevoegdheid optimaal gebruik nie. Die feit dat die paneel aanbeveel dat die eiendomsklousule nie gewysig behoort te word nie en dat die staat eerder sy onteieningsbevoegdhede aggressiewer moet gebruik, spreek dus boekdele.

’n Verdere rede waarom hierdie argument nie steek hou nie, is die spesifieke kontekste waarbinne die staat eiendom mag onteien en hoe dit na gelang van elke geval mag verskil. Neem byvoorbeeld die vervalle geboue in die ou Johannesburgse middestad, waarna reeds verwys is. Gegewe die feit dat baie van hierdie geboue se eienaars die geboue agterweë gelaat het weens die gebied se verval, asook om munisipale en ander belastings te ontduik, is die markwaarde van hierdie geboue waarskynlik baie laag. Die staat sou dus waarskynlik hierdie geboue kon onteien vir ’n appel en ’n ei (byvoorbeeld deur die genoemde belastings bloot af te skryf), dit opknap en dit dan beskikbaar stel aan diegene wat dringend behuising benodig. Hier sal die betaling van “markwaarde” vir die eiendom dus geensins ’n probleem inhou nie. Dit is noemenswaardig dat daar sprake is dat die Johannesburgse plaaslike regering onlangs met so ’n inisiatief begin het.

4.2      Die (on)wenslikheid daarvan om vergoeding vir onteiening te betaal

Die faktore in artikel 25(3) vereis dus ’n kontekstuele benadering betreffende die vasstelling van vergoeding, een wat ’n billike ewewig toon tussen die openbare belang en die belange van diegene wat geraak word. Dit beteken egter nie markwaarde is onbelangrik of dat vergoeding teen minder as markwaarde die verstekposisie is nie. Inteendeel, dit is nog ’n ope vraag of onteiening teen minder as markwaarde (of selfs teen R0) grondwetlik geldig sou wees indien geen van die ander faktore in artikel 25(3) ’n beduidende rol speel nie. Om in so ’n geval minder as markwaarde te betaal, behels twee probleme: een is grondwetlik en die ander ekonomies van aard.

Eerstens, vanuit ’n grondwetlike perspektief mag vergoeding teen minder as markwaarde moontlik onregverdigbaar indruis teen een of meer van die ander fundamentele regte in die Handves van Menseregte. Dit mag byvoorbeeld op ongelyke behandeling voor die gereg neerkom (gelykheid word in artikel 9 van die Grondwet verskans), aangesien ’n eienaar wie se eiendom vir grondhervorming onteien word, minder as markwaarde gaan kry (indien Du Plessis se argument verwesenlik word), terwyl eienaars wie se grond vir tradisionele doeleindes (soos paaie) onteien word, in beginsel volle markwaarde ontvang. Ook ingevolge administratiefregtelike geregtigheid, wat in artikel 33 verskans is, is daar moontlike probleme, aangesien die meeste onteienings by wyse van administratiewe handelinge plaasvind. Artikel 33 van die Grondwet, tesame met die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid 3 van 2000, vereis dat alle administratiewe handelinge regmatig, redelik en prosedureel billik moet wees. Gegewe die indringende aard van ’n onteiening sal die besluit om te onteien waarskynlik onderworpe wees aan ’n streng proporsionaliteitstoets ten einde vas te stel of dit “redelik” is. Een van die hoofkenmerke van so ’n toets is of daar minder indringende middele beskikbaar is om dieselfde doel te bereik (byvoorbeeld om hoegenaamd nie te onteien sonder vergoeding nie). Indien wel, mag dit tot die tersydestelling van ’n onteiening deur ’n geregshof lei.

Selfs al volg die regering ’n benadering waar geen (wit) grondeienaars enige vergoeding vir onteiening ontvang nie, mag so ’n benadering indruis teen die reg op menswaardigheid (artikel 10 van die Grondwet). Dit is veral die geval omdat so ’n benadering die onteiende party in baie gevalle finansieel sal ruïneer en sonder ’n dak oor sy of haar kop sal laat, wat op sy beurt strydig sal wees met die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising (artikel 26(1) van die Grondwet). Daarby mag die pleging van ’n nuwe ongeregtigheid (die onteiening van eiendom teen min of geen vergoeding) ten einde die ongeregtighede van die verlede aan te spreek (deur grondhervorming te laat geskied) indruis teen die versoenende gees waarbinne die Grondwet ontstaan het. In die aanhef tot die Grondwet word genoem dat dit aangeneem is om die “verdeeldheid van die verlede te genees en ’n samelewing gegrond op demokratiese waardes, maatskaplike geregtigheid en basiese menseregte te skep”. Dit is te betwyfel of die onteiening van (’n minderheidsgroep se) eiendom teen min of geen vergoeding met hierdie visie sal strook, veral gesien hoe die meerderheid se grond in baie gevalle deur die apartheidsregering weggeneem is teen betaling van min of selfs geen vergoeding nie.

Terselfdertyd moet wel aanvaar word dat die meerderheid se belang om grond te bekom dringend verwesenlik moet word. Die oplossing tot hierdie vraagstuk berus dus nie by ’n keuse wat gemaak moet word tussen grondhervorming sonder vergoeding en grondhervorming met vergoeding nie. Die vraag is eerder hoe om die bestaande uitdagings, wat nie voor die deur van vergoeding gelê kan word nie, uit die weg te ruim sodat toegang tot grond in die nabye toekoms ’n werklikheid vir die meerderheid Suid-Afrikaners kan word. Juanita Pienaar, ’n spesialis op die gebied van grondhervorming, som hierdie benadering soos volg op in haar artikel “Onteiening sonder vergoeding: voorvereiste vir suksesvolle grondhervorming of populisme?” wat onlangs op LitNet verskyn het:

Navorsing op globale skaal het aangedui dat grondhervormingsprogramme waar vergoeding vir onteiening betaal is, in die algemeen beter ondersteun en dus oorhoofs meer suksesvol was as in gevalle waar konfiskering van grond of dreigende onregmatige grondbesetting as dryfvere ingespan is. Selfs gevalle waar laer as markwaarde betaal is (mits dit nie aansienlik laer was nie), was steeds aanvaarbaar en het ondersteuning van grondeienaars, en gevolglik beter samewerking, bewerkstellig.

Tweedens, vanuit ’n ekonomiese perspektief toon gevalle in ander lande dat die betaling van minder as markwaarde negatiewe gevolge vir die ekonomie kan inhou. Ontleders is dit eens dat die niebetaling van vergoeding geen towerstaf in die regering se hand sal wees waarmee grondhervorming oornag verwesenlik sal kan word nie. Gegewe die feit dat dit nie vergoeding is wat die hoofstruikelblok tot grondhervorming is nie, kan daar met reg gevra word of die afskaffing van vergoeding hoegenaamd die versnelling van grondhervorming teweeg sal bring. Die langtermyn nadelige gevolge van so ’n stap mag die (klaarblyklik) korttermynvoordele oorskadu. Die redes hiervoor sluit in dat onteiening sonder vergoeding waarskynlik tot die vernietiging van plaaslike en internasionale beleggersvertroue sal lei, dat dit ’n negatiewe impak op die bankbedryf sal hê (omdat verbande op onteiende grond waardeloos sal word en nie teen die staat afdwingbaar sal wees nie), en dat dit landbouproduktiwiteit en voedselsekerheid nadelig mag beïnvloed. Gegewe die rol wat buitelandse beleggings in die plaaslike ekonomie speel, sal die onttrekking van buitelandse kapitaal rampspoedige gevolge vir die ekonomie inhou. Dit sal tot ’n dramatiese vermindering van die rand se waarde lei, wat ironies genoeg die armste en kwesbaarste persone in ons land (op wie die grondhervormingsprogramme juis gerig is) die hardste sal tref.

5. Gevolgtrekking

Die ANC se resolusie om te onteien sonder vergoeding is dus nie net teenstrydig met die Grondwet nie, dit druis ook lynreg in teen die aanbevelings van voormalige president Motlanthe se paneel. Verder strook dit nie met die ANC se verwerping van die EFF se mosie in die parlement in 2017 nie, waar hulle ’n mosie ter tafel gelê het om die eiendomsklousule te wysig om voorsiening te maak vir onteiening sonder vergoeding. Die eiendomsklousule sal daarom gewysig moet word indien daar met hierdie resolusie voortgegaan wil word.

Dit is wel moeilik om te sien hoe die resolusie verwesenlik kan word sonder om die voorwaardes wat daaraan gekoppel word, te verbreek. In hierdie opsig slaan Steven Friedman, in sy berig “Is South Africa’s ANC bent on radical policies? Here’s why the answer is no” wat onlangs op The Conversation se webblad verskyn het, die spyker op die kop deur aan te voer dat adjunkpresident Ramaphosa, met sy verkiesing tot ANC-president, hom in ’n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind het. Dit is omdat baie afgevaardigdes aangedring het op die versnelling van grondhervorming deur van die vergoedingsvereiste vir onteiening af te sien. Indien hierdie voorstel nie gesteun sou word nie, was daar ’n groot moontlikheid dat die verrigtinge plat sou val en selfs dat geweld sou kon uitbreek. Die feit dat hy dit gesteun het, maar onderhewig gemaak het aan pragmatiese – en ekonomies verantwoordelike – voorwaardes, verteenwoordig daarom dus waarskynlik meer ’n oefening in realpolitik as ’n werklike radikalisering van die ANC se ekonomiese beleid.

Ondertussen skyn dit onnodig vir grondeienaars te wees om snags wakker te lê. Enoch Godongwana, voorsitter van die ANC se ekonomiese-transformasie-komitee, het na aanleiding van adjunkpresident Ramaphosa se aankondiging gesê dat die ANC eers sal probeer om grondhervorming te versnel voordat daar aan die eiendomsklousule getorring sal word. Dit strook met die voorstelle van voormalige president Motlanthe se paneel. Verder het adjunkpresident Ramaphosa self onlangs genoem dat daar probeer sal word om eers staatsgrond te verkry om herverdeling van eiendom in veral die stedelike omgewings te verwesenlik voordat privaatgrond die teiken van onteienings sal word. Bykomend wil hy ’n kommissie aanstel ten einde te bepaal wat gebeur het met grond wat sedert 1994 as deel van die grondhervormingsprogramme herverdeel is. Dit is vanweë die feit dat baie plase wat intussen herverdeel is of deur middel van die grondrestitusieprogram aan persone of gemeenskappe wat dit tydens apartheid verloor het, teruggegee is, nou onproduktief is. Die rede waarom daar na hierdie kwessie gekyk gaan word is juis om landbouproduktiwiteit en voedselsekerheid te verseker.

Ten spyte van die klaarblyklike populistiese retoriek van die ANC se resolusie, maak die streng voorwaardes waaraan dit onderhewig gemaak is, dit moeilik om sonder meer onteiening sonder vergoeding te hê. Die huidige grondwetlike bestel bied genoeg beweegruimte vir die regering om grondhervorming op ’n verantwoordelike, dog dringende en omvattende, basis te verwesenlik. Dit is wel nog te vroeg om te sê wat die pad vorentoe presies sal inhou. Die ANC beplan byvoorbeeld ’n konferensie in Maart vanjaar, waar relevante staatsdepartemente en belangegroepe gaan byeenkom, om die pad vorentoe te bespreek. Daarna sal ons, hopelik, groter klarigheid rondom grondhervorming en onteiening hê. Wat wel duidelik is, is dat die stadige pas van grondhervorming nie voor die deur van die eiendomsklousule gelê kan word nie.

• EJ Marais is ’n senior lektor in die Departement Privaatreg aan die Universiteit van Johannesburg. Hy spesialiseer in onteieningsreg en grondwetlike sakereg in die algemeen. Hy is ’n stigterslid van die Expropriation Law Expert Group, ’n liggaam van internasionale onteieningsregkenners wat jaarliks byeenkom om brandende kwessies op hierdie terrein te bespreek. Die sienings wat in hierdie stuk vervat is, is sy eie mening en moet nie aan sy werkgewer toegeskryf word nie.

Lees ook:

• Onteiening sonder vergoeding: voorvereiste vir suksesvolle grondhervorming of populisme?
• Onteieningswetsontwerp: ongrondwetlik of noodsaaklik?

Is expropriation without compensation really the answer? 

• This article is based on the 2012 LitNet Akademies (Regte)-article, “Eiendomsverlies deur verkrygende verjaring: Onteiening sonder vergoeding – of nie?” by AJ van der Walt and EJ Marais. Also refer to the English abstract in the text.

 1. Introduction

With his election to the position of ANC president in December 2017, deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the party adopted a resolution in terms of which land reform will be accelerated by expropriating land without compensation. This must be done, however, in a way that does not undermine agricultural productivity, food security or the economy. Questions are now being asked, especially by landowners, as to what the future holds. This opinion piece considers two matters, namely (i) the meaning of expropriation, and (ii) what the current requirements are for determining expropriatory compensation under the Constitution. In the latter context, which is the focal point of this piece, I also consider the (un)desirability of not awarding any compensation for expropriation. Before these matters are analysed, it is necessary first to consider the relevant background.

2. Background

After 24 years of democracy, there are still millions of South Africans who have inadequate or no access to land. This causes two problems: these persons do not have adequate housing, which undermines their human dignity, while also depriving them of the wealth-creating opportunities which land offers. Expropriation can play a key role in addressing these injustices.

In short, expropriation is a state power in terms of which it can acquire property from owners compulsorily against payment of compensation. It is worth noting that the state has not really used this power over the last 24 years to realise land reform. One of the reasons for this is the government’s “willing-buyer-willing-seller” policy, which has been followed to ensure local and foreign investor confidence. This policy has delayed land reform, as landowners were not necessarily keen to sell their land to the state. They could also, in theory, ask any price they wanted (including artificially high prices), since a willing seller (this is the person from whom the state, as the willing buyer, wants to purchase the property) is not bound to the market value of the property. If the government, as the willing buyer, could not reach consensus with the seller, the land could not be acquired. Expropriation would have made a major difference in this context, as it does not require the co-operation or permission of landowners. Furthermore, the amount of compensation must be just and equitable, which – even if it were market value – would probably be lower than the price a willing seller would be able to obtain in the open market. An owner cannot delay the expropriation by objecting to the compensation amount. An expropriated owner who is unhappy with the compensation amount has no other choice but to let the state have the property and then to challenge the compensation amount in a court of law, which will then determine whether the amount offered is just and equitable.

3. The expropriation concept

Expropriation is an ancient concept which already formed part of Roman law more than 2 000 years ago. The apartheid state also had this power. Today, this power is derived from section 25(2)–(4) of the Constitution, read with the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. The constitutional provisions enjoy preference in as far as the Constitution and the act do not align. Section 25(2) of the Constitution stipulates that expropriation may only occur in terms of law of general application for a public purpose or in the public interest against payment of just and equitable compensation. “Public purpose” includes purposes such as the building of roads, hospitals and schools (the so-called “traditional purposes” for which land is usually expropriated). As regards “public interest”, section 25(4)(a) provides that it “includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources”. Expropriation, therefore, usually entails the compulsory acquisition of property by the state – in other words, without the owner’s permission or co-operation – against payment of compensation. The state does not always have to be the ultimate owner – private persons, such as beneficiaries of a land reform programme (especially under the land redistribution programme), may also be the ultimate owners of the expropriated property. It is thus impossible for the state to circumvent its obligation to pay compensation by claiming that the acquisition of property by private persons in such a context does not amount to state acquisition of property.

There are two reasons why compensation is paid to expropriated property holders, namely:

(i) To prevent unequal treatment of persons before the law (usually, there is only one owner or a small group of owners who are affected by an expropriation, which expropriation then benefits society at large)

(ii) To put expropriated parties, as far as possible, in the same position they would have been in had the expropriation not occurred. The compensation, therefore, serves as substitute for the property which the state acquired.

4. The compensation issue

4.1 Calculating just and equitable compensation

One does not find the “willing-buyer-willing-seller” policy anywhere in section 25 (the property clause). This approach, as stated above, was government policy which was followed to appease investors. Section 25(2)–(3) of the Constitution requires payment of just and equitable compensation to expropriated persons. In addition, the amount of compensation must also reflect “an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected”.

It is usually said that the compensation requirement frustrates land reform, specifically for two reasons. On the one hand, it (apparently) makes land reform unaffordable because the state must pay market value compensation for each and every expropriation. On the other hand, it is unfair that landowners, many of whom are still white and who, therefore, enjoyed the benefits of apartheid, obtain a second benefit when their property is expropriated against market value.

The first argument is based on two assumptions, namely that market value compensation is always required, and that payment of such compensation makes expropriation unaffordable. The Constitution requires payment of just and equitable compensation, not market value compensation. Thus, the eventual compensation amount need not necessarily be equal to market value. Section 25(3) sets out five factors that must be considered when compensation is determined. They are as follows (this discussion is largely based on AJ van der Walt’s Constitutional property law (3rd edition, 2011), pp 503–20 and A Gildenhuys’s Onteieningsreg (2nd edition, 2001), pp 170–9):

(a) The current use of the property. This factor is probably relevant when the state expropriates scarce resources (such as urban land where housing is urgently needed, or quality agricultural land for upcoming farmers) which are not used productively. However, the mere fact that property is not used productively ought not, on its own, to result in a decrease in the amount of compensation. Such an approach may amount to punishing the owner, which will mean that the expropriation is not in the public interest and, therefore, invalid. Nonetheless, ownership does not only confer rights on owners concerning how they may use their property, but it also entails obligations. This view finds support in the fact that the amount of compensation must reflect an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. It could, therefore, mean that uses of property which are really morally and socially unacceptable in society (such as by owners of abandoned and decaying buildings in the Johannesburg inner city) might justify a downward adjustment in the amount of compensation, especially if they really deprive homeless persons of access to much-needed housing.

(b) The history of the acquisition and use of the property. If the state acquired property at a discount (or even for free), which happened in many cases during apartheid, and was then donated to a white farmer or sold to such farmer at a discount, it would be unfair if the state now pays market value compensation when it expropriates the land from this farmer. Yet, it is unclear what the outcome of this factor would be if the initial farmer subsequently sold the land to another person who paid market value for it. It is unclear whether the new owner would have to be content with less than market value simply because the initial acquisition of the land occurred in an unjust manner, especially since it can be argued that in South Africa (at least initially), land, on many occasions, was acquired in a manner which is questionable from a moral perspective.

(c) The market value of the property. Market value must be distinguished from the price a willing seller is willing to accept for property. Market value is mostly determined through the so-called comparable-sales method, in terms of which one looks at the prices at which land of similar size in the same area was sold over a certain period of time. As such, market value may be lower than the value a willing seller would have wanted to obtain for the property on the open market.

(d) The extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property. This consideration is similar in many ways to factor (b) above. The problem is, again, what role it will play if the current landowner paid market value for the land and did not directly benefit from the investment and subsidy from the state.

(e) The purpose of the expropriation. This consideration must be distinguished from the reason (in other words, the public purpose or interest) for which the property is expropriated, and which, therefore, justifies the expropriation. Professor Elmien du Plessis (in her chapter in Rethinking expropriation law I – Public interest in expropriation (2015) by B Hoops et al (editors)) argued that it would be just to award compensation below market value if the expropriation were aimed at realising transformation or social justice. The reason for this, according to her, is because market value compensation makes such purposes unaffordable (I return to this argument under the next heading below). In the absence of clear guidelines as to how compensation must be determined in this context, it might lead to unpredictability and inconsistency in legal practice. For instance, one judge might decrease the amount of compensation by 17% (as was done by the Land Claims Court in the Msiza case in 2016), and another may decrease it by 80%, for the sake of argument. It would be preferable if Parliament created certainty in this regard, since the Expropriation Bill of 2016 (B4D-2015) is silent on this matter. It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court of Appeal, in 2017 in the appeal of the Msiza judgment, held that it is impermissible to adjust the amount of compensation downward merely because the purpose is aimed at land reform. (The case is currently being appealed to the Constitutional Court, which means we might have binding precedent on this matter soon.)

To summarise: the amount of compensation depends on the specific circumstances of each instance and will, therefore, not necessarily be equal to market value. The Constitutional Court follows a so-called “two-step” approach, where the market value of the property is determined first, after which it looks at the other factors in section 25(3) to ascertain whether the compensation amount should be adjusted upwards or downwards. Some authors and judges think that this approach unjustifiably elevates market value to the position of the most important factor in section 25(3). Yet, it is hard to see why a landowner must accept less than market value if none of the factors justify a downward adjustment. In other words, there may be instances (it may even turn out to be the norm) where payment of market value will be required. This supposition is not necessarily controversial, since foreign legal systems like German law, European Union law, Australian law and Irish law follow a similar approach.

This brings us to the question of whether paying market value compensation really makes land reform unaffordable. In this regard, the November 2017 report of the ANC’s high level panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, which was chaired by former president Kgalema Motlanthe, is insightful. It mentions that only 0,4% of the national budget is allocated to land reform, with less than 0,1% dedicated to land redistribution (which is, arguably, the most important programme when it comes to poverty alleviation). It also states that the compensation requirement for expropriation “has not been the most serious constraint on land reform in South Africa to date”. Other constraints, like “increasing evidence of corruption by officials, the diversion of the land reform budget to elites, lack of political will, and lack of training and capacity, have proved more serious stumbling blocks to land reform”. It was also found that the state has not used its expropriation powers optimally. The fact that the panel recommends that the property clause should not be changed and that the state should rather use its expropriation power more aggressively therefore speaks volumes.

Another reason why this argument does not hold water is the specific contexts in which the state may expropriate property, and how it can differ from case to case. Take, for instance, the abandoned buildings in the old Johannesburg inner city, to which reference was already made. The fact that many of the owners of these buildings abandoned them due to the overall decline of the area, and to escape municipal and other taxes, means that the market value of these buildings is probably very low. The state would thus probably be able to expropriate these buildings for next to nothing (for instance, by writing off the mentioned taxes), improve them and make them available to those persons who urgently need housing. Here, the payment of “market value” for the property would thus not present any problems. It is noteworthy that there is mention of the Johannesburg local authority recently having started such an initiative.

4.2 The (un)desirability of paying compensation for expropriation

The factors in section 25(3) thus require a contextual approach when determining compensation, one which reflects an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. This, however, does not mean that market value is unimportant or that compensation below market value is the default position. On the contrary, it is still an open question whether compensation below market value (or even R0) will be constitutionally valid if none of the other factors play a meaningful role. To pay less than market value in such a situation presents two problems: one is constitutional, and the other economic, in nature.

Firstly, below-market-value compensation, from a constitutional perspective, may possibly result in an unjustifiable infringement of one or more rights in the Bill of Rights. It may, for instance, amount to unequal treatment before the law (equality is guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution), since an owner whose property is expropriated for land reform will receive less than market value (if Professor Du Plessis’s argument is followed), while owners whose land is expropriated for traditional purposes (like building roads) will receive full market value, in principle. As regards administrative justice, which is protected in section 33, there are also problems, since most expropriations occur via administrative action. Section 33 of the Constitution, together with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, requires all administrative actions to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Due to the invasive nature of an expropriation, the decision to expropriate will probably be subjected to a strict proportionality test to establish whether it is “reasonable”. One of the main characteristics of such a test is whether there are less intrusive means to reach the same goal (such as, for example, not expropriating the property at all). If so, it may result in the expropriation being set aside by a court of law.

Even if the government follows an approach where no (white) landowners receive any compensation for expropriation, it may infringe the right to human dignity (section 10 of the Constitution). This is because this would, in many cases, financially ruin the expropriated parties and leave them without a roof over their heads, which would – in turn – conflict with the right to have access to adequate housing (section 26(1) of the Constitution). Furthermore, committing a new injustice (the expropriation of property for no or little compensation) to rectify an injustice of the past (by realising land reform) may be at odds with the reconciliatory spirit on which the Constitution came into being. The preamble to the Constitution mentions that it was adopted to “[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”. It is doubtful whether expropriating (a minority group’s) property for little or no compensation is in line with this vision, especially since the majority’s land was taken away by the apartheid government, in many instances, for little or no compensation.

At the same time, it must be accepted that the majority’s interest to acquire land must be realised urgently. The solution to this question does, therefore, not require one having to choose between land reform with or without compensation. The question is rather how existing challenges, which cannot be attributed to the compensation requirement, can be solved, to ensure that access to land becomes a reality for the majority of South Africans in the near future. Professor Juanita Pienaar, a specialist in the area of land reform, summarises this approach as follows in her piece (“Expropriation without compensation: prerequisite for successful land reform or populism?” (“Onteiening sonder vergoeding: voorvereiste vir suksesvolle grondhervorming of populisme?”)) that recently appeared on LitNet:

Research on a global scale has indicated that land reform programmes where compensation was paid for expropriation were generally better supported and were overall more successful than in cases where land was confiscated or where threats of unlawful occupation of land were used as incentive to promote reform. Even instances where lower than market value was paid (as long as it was not significantly lower) were acceptable and obtained support from landowners and, consequently, resulted in better co-operation. (Own translation)

Secondly, from an economic perspective, experience in other countries reveals that paying less than market value could have negative repercussions for the economy. Analysts agree that non-payment of compensation would not be a magic wand in the hand of the state, in terms of which land reform would be realised overnight. Given the fact that compensation is not the main impediment to land reform, it may very well be asked whether the abolition of compensation would result in the acceleration of land reform at all. The long-term negative consequences of such a step might outweigh the (seemingly) short-term advantages. This is because expropriation without compensation would probably destroy local and international investor confidence, would have a negative impact on the banking industry (because mortgages of expropriated land would be worthless and would be unenforceable against the state), and may negatively impact agricultural productivity and food security. Given the role that foreign investments play in the local economy, a withdrawal of foreign capital from South Africa would have disastrous consequences. This would lead to a dramatic devaluation in the rand’s value, which would – ironically – affect the poor and most vulnerable persons in our country (who are supposed to benefit from the land reform programmes) most.

5. Conclusion

The ANC’s resolution to have expropriation without compensation is, therefore, not only at odds with the Constitution, but is also contrary to the recommendations of former president Motlanthe’s panel. It, furthermore, does not square with the ANC’s rejection of the EFF’s motion in Parliament in 2017, where they tabled a motion to alter the property clause to allow for expropriation without compensation. The property clause will, therefore, have to be changed if the ANC wants to go ahead with this resolution.

It is difficult to see how the resolution can be realised without compromising the conditions which are attached to it. In this regard, Professor Steven Friedman, in his article (“Is South Africa’s ANC bent on radical policies? Here’s why the answer is no”) that recently appeared on the website of The Conversation, is spot on where he states that deputy president Ramaphosa, with his election as ANC president, found himself in an unenviable position. This is because many of the delegates demanded that land reform be accelerated by doing away with the compensation requirement for expropriation. If this motion were not supported, there was the very real possibility that the conference would have collapsed, and that violence might even have broken out. The fact that he supported it but qualified it in terms of pragmatic – and economically responsible – conditions is, therefore, probably more an exercise in realpolitik than a true radicalisation of ANC’s policy.

For the time being, it seems unwarranted for landowners to lie awake at night. In light of deputy president Ramaphosa’s announcement, Mr Enoch Godongwana, chairperson of the ANC’s committee for economic transformation, said that the ANC will first try to accelerate land reform before changing the property clause. This corresponds with the recommendations of former president Motlanthe’s panel. Furthermore, deputy president Ramaphosa recently mentioned that the government will try to use state land in urban settings to realise land redistribution before targeting private land. He also wants to appoint a commission to ascertain what has happened to land which has been redistributed in terms of land reform since 1994. This is because many farms that were redistributed or were returned (in terms of the land restitution programme) to persons or communities who had lost the land during apartheid, are now unproductive. The reason for this investigation is exactly to promote agricultural activity and to ensure food security.

Despite the initial appearance of populist rhetoric of the ANC’s resolution, it is subject to such stringent conditions that it will be difficult just to expropriate property without compensation. The current constitutional dispensation offers sufficient room for the state to realise land reform on a responsible, though urgent and comprehensive, basis. It is still too early to tell what the road ahead holds exactly. The ANC, for instance, is planning a conference in March, where relevant government departments and stakeholders will meet, to discuss the way forward. Thereafter, we will, hopefully, have more certainty regarding land reform and expropriation. What is clear, though, is that the slow pace of land reform thus far cannot be attributed to the property clause.

• Dr EJ Marais is a senior lecturer in the department of private law at the University of Johannesburg. He specialises in expropriation law and constitutional property law generally. He is a founding member of the Expropriation Law Expert Group, a body of international expropriation law experts who meet annually to discuss topical issues in this legal field. The views expressed in this piece are his own and should not be attributed to his employer.