South Africa is attempting something rare in its post-apartheid history, a grand political experiment born out of necessity. After the African National Congress (ANC) lost its three-decade parliamentary majority in May’s elections, the country stepped into the uncharted territory of a coalition of inconvenience rather than ideological similarities. The parties are bound together by a shared fear of political irrelevance and national government collapse.
This second Government of National Unity (GNU), assembled with haste and brittle hope, is the most audacious and perilous political arrangement since the country’s rebirth in 1994. Far from being a moment of renewal and political equitation, like the first one, this GNU creation was a reluctant necessity, an uneasy truce brokered in the aftermath of the ANC’s dramatic descent to 40,18% in the national elections.
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Open quarrels over economic policy, public recriminations between ministers, and a sense of drift has clouded what was supposed to be a moment for a collective vision to solve urgent national needs. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the drama surrounding the national budget vote, where for a moment it seemed that the new government might fail at its first hurdle. And in the recent firing of a Democratic Alliance (DA)-affiliated deputy minister.
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After three uninterrupted decades in power, the ANC (the former custodian of South Africa’s liberation legacy) was chastened by an electorate weary of broken promises, endemic corruption, institutional decay and the slow erosion of faith in economic transformation. The GNU’s uneasy infancy reveals what many feared, that South Africa is no longer facing a passing crisis, but a test of democratic durability, institutional integrity and a test of whether national governance can rise above the shrill imperatives of party survival.
In its early weeks, the GNU has offered as much confusion as instability. Open quarrels over economic policy, public recriminations between ministers, and a sense of drift has clouded what was supposed to be a moment for a collective vision to solve urgent national needs. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the drama surrounding the national budget vote, where for a moment it seemed that the new government might fail at its first hurdle. And in the recent firing of a Democratic Alliance (DA)-affiliated deputy minister.
In late June, finance minister Enoch Godongwana (ANC) introduced the budget to Parliament, sending subtle signals that value-added tax (VAT) might rise in the coming fiscal cycle to stabilise South Africa’s battered finances. This possibility triggered an instant backlash from most political parties, including the ANC. John Steenhuisen, leader of the DA – the ANC’s main GNU partner – publicly declared that VAT hikes were “off the table”, contradicting his own finance counterpart and undermining the principle of collective cabinet responsibility. Analysts feared a crisis, since the GNU could not even agree on its first budget.
It became blatantly clear that the GNU is not a grand coalition of aligned minds, but a precarious lattice of ideological opposites and historical rivals: the centre-left ANC, the centre-right DA, the regionalist Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and a miscellany of minor players such as the United Democratic Movement (UDM), GOOD, the Patriotic Alliance (PA) and Al Jama-ah. It is less a vision than a desperate firewall against a legislative gridlock and the looming spectre of populist fragmentation in the form of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the newly formed uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) with former ANC president, Jacob Zuma. As political analyst Richard Calland observed, “The alternative was unthinkable” – either a fragile minority government lurching between crises, or a combustible coalition with firebrand populists poised to strike a match to set alight the social fabric of the country.
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True to character, Jacob Zuma’s return to frontline politics through the MK plunged South African politics into a vortex of volatility that necessitated the formation of the GNU, and fear of the MK is probably the only strong glue keeping the DA within the GNU.
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True to character, Jacob Zuma’s return to frontline politics through the MK plunged South African politics into a vortex of volatility that necessitated the formation of the GNU, and fear of the MK is probably the only strong glue keeping the DA within the GNU. They fear the possible chaotic governing alliance between the ANC, the MK and the EFF more than anything else. Zuma is the modern echo of Chaos itself, both creator and destroyer. What began as a populist uprising cloaked in revolutionary nostalgia has devolved into a theatre of infighting, legal contradictions and strategic incoherence. Zuma, ever the political shapeshifter, presides over the disorder as its chief alchemist, fuelling confusion and frequenting courts of law to face numerous longstanding cases of corruption, fraud and racketeering. The MK has become less a political party than a vehicle for vengeance, a personal crusade dressed in the camouflage of liberation rhetoric. Its internal leadership is changed like underwear, its constitutional standing is in limbo, and its ideological identity swings between radical economic rhetoric and populist pragmatism. Some members claim Marxist fidelity, while others quote Scripture and Zulu nationalism. The only constant is the cult around Zuma himself as an enigmatic figure who thrives in disorder, often advancing by destabilising. Zuma is not merely navigating the storm; he is the storm that the DA and its financial markets most fear getting to the helm of governance.
The fault lines of the GNU are widening. The ANC, long habituated to unchecked authority, governs as though its majority remains intact. It is aloof, imperious and unwilling to yield. The DA, for its part, behaves like a moral auditor rather than a partner in power, brandishing its influence to extract concessions and threatening walkouts cloaked in the language of principle. Neither has adjusted to the new order. Most smaller parties, with the exception of the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), are caught in between wanting to protect their government portfolios and seeking more relevance by throwing in their lot with the ANC. For occasional populist relevance, they act as if the GNU is a coalition of grievance, not governance. With marginal constituencies and inflated egos, some even threaten to derail national policy over local quarrels or narrow self-interest. The result could be a chorus of discord that weakens the state’s ability to project coherence, direction and resolve. But behind the scenes and in front of the president, they sing a different tune.
The collective power of the smaller coalition partners, though long treated as ornaments in the ANC-DA showdown, emerged during the VAT hike crises when the DA refused to vote for the government budget, citing the legit reasoning of non-consultation. The smaller parties emerged as unlikely stabilisers. The UDM and IFP, who have styled themselves as the adults in the GNU room, while opposed to the VAT hike, quietly signalled their support for fiscal compromise and urged both parties to settle tensions internally. Patricia de Lille’s GOOD party appealed for unity and publicly backed the budget, even while expressing reservations about VAT. Most surprisingly, the PA, known for its bombastic rhetoric, aligned itself with this broader GNU consensus, so long as local government funding for housing and safety was preserved. This is how the finance minister was able to pass the budget with a scheduled moratorium on the hike within a month. In the end, the hike was reversed by a Parliamentary vote, throwing an egg on the faces of the unlikely coalition of the DA and EFF that had taken the minister to court, challenging the constitutionality of the act.
Perhaps more insidious is the rising influence of the white conservative fringe, particularly the FF+ and their ideological fellow travellers. Frustrated by the ANC’s enduring symbolic authority and its hold over state institutions, some factions within this cohort have begun courting the international right, especially elements within the American MAGA Trump movement.
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Perhaps more insidious is the rising influence of the white conservative fringe, particularly the FF+ and their ideological fellow travellers. ... Theirs is a politics of distortion, seductive to outsiders unfamiliar with South Africa’s racial history, and dangerous to the country’s constitutional order. Their strategy is not merely cynical; it is corrosive.
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Their message is calculated. They cloak their discomfort with political transformation as civilisational alarm, reframe redistribution as reverse discrimination, and appeal to global audiences with tales of white marginalisation and genocide because of the country’s unchecked crime epidemic. Theirs is a politics of distortion, seductive to outsiders unfamiliar with South Africa’s racial history, and dangerous to the country’s constitutional order. Their strategy is not merely cynical; it is corrosive. It risks inviting foreign interference under false pretences, and turning South Africa’s unresolved past into a pawn of global ideological battles.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states clearly that political actors are bound to respect cooperative governance, constitutional supremacy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. To court foreign actors in efforts to destabilise domestic legitimacy arguably violates both the letter and the spirit of the republic’s founding document. A legislative response is long overdue. South Africa’s Parliament should enact a Foreign Political Influence Regulation Act, akin to Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme or America’s Foreign Agents Registration Act. Such legislation would compel disclosure of foreign lobbying, funding or ideological affiliations seeking to shape domestic outcomes. Our civil society, too, needs to remain vigilant in understanding that not all dissent is democratic. Some of it is dressed in imported uniforms, bearing passports of destabilisation.
Beyond the ideological rifts of the GNU lies a deeper malaise of institutional rot. The ANC’s patronage networks, emboldened during the Zuma era, remain stubbornly strong, hollowing out state capacity and sabotaging procurement systems. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s reformist posture, while more credible than his predecessor’s, has often been more symbolic than structural. The DA, for all its rhetoric of clean governance, is not immune to ethical drift. Auditor-general reports have flagged governance failures in municipalities like Tshwane, as well as the consultant capture, tender irregularities and opaque appointments in Cape Town. These may not always rise to criminality, but they erode the moral high ground the DA often claims. No party owns virtue in this coalition.
The GNU’s cabinet formation process revealed the rot in full view. Ministerial appointments were reduced to spoils-trading, with key economic portfolios treated as bargaining chips, not as pillars of recovery. At a moment when competence is a national imperative, South Africa is governed by compromise. This has yielded a cacophony of policy contradictions. The ANC champions Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and land reform; the DA insists on market efficiency and “merit”. On National Health Insurance, GNU ministers publicly contradict each other. Governance has become theatre, and paralysis threatens to be its tragic plot.
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Coalition partners disagree. That’s normal. But successful coalitions manage disagreements quietly and resolve them systematically. South Africa, by contrast, is airing its quarrels in public, with ministers openly contradicting each other and punishing rivals as if in opposition.
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The firing of deputy minister Andrew Whitfield – a DA member who made an unauthorised visit to the USA – was framed by Steenhuisen as a double standard of enforcing selected discipline on opposition parties, while holding ANC ministers long accused of misconduct to a different and more lenient standard. The breach of government protocol by deputy minister Whitfield was perceived by the ANC as a DA act of political overreach and a violation of presidential authority and prerogative. The incident showcased once again the lack of trust between the GNU partners. Coalition partners disagree. That’s normal. But successful coalitions manage disagreements quietly and resolve them systematically. South Africa, by contrast, is airing its quarrels in public, with ministers openly contradicting each other and punishing rivals as if in opposition.
What South Africa’s GNU lacks is precisely what makes countries like Germany masters of coalition governance – a binding, detailed coalition contract. In Berlin, coalition partners negotiate policy compromises before taking office. They establish protocols for resolving disputes and clarify who gets to decide what. South Africa’s GNU, by contrast, is a vague handshake deal sealed in haste, with no publicly accessible pact to guide its actions. Germany also leans on the Ressortprinzip, giving ministerial autonomy within a framework of collective responsibility. Public attacks across portfolios are forbidden. Ministers may disagree in private, but unity is projected in public. South Africa has inverted that, and ministers operate as party operatives first, cabinet members second. This is not sustainable.
If South Africa’s coalition is to survive its infancy, it must learn from Berlin, where the choreography of compromise has been refined over decades. Germany’s coalitions are not perfect, but they endure because structure restrains chaos. South Africa’s GNU also needs a detailed, legally enforceable agreement akin to Germany’s Koalitionsvertrag. This should outline shared priorities, limits and specific compromises, and be made public for transparency. The current GNU founding statement is too vague to govern a nation of 60 million people. Disputes must be managed discreetly. A cabinet dispute committee, chaired by the president or deputy president, must be established and empowered to resolve ideological tensions behind closed doors. Public squabbles cannot remain the default. Ministers from all coalition parties must be allowed to govern their portfolios without sabotage or micromanagement. Authority must flow from the Constitution and GNU agreement, not party patronage.
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Coalition politics is not about ideological triumph, but deliverable results – rebuilding Eskom, fixing Transnet, unclogging ports, revitalising public education, etc. These are tasks that transcend partisan lines. No coalition can function without a competent, apolitical bureaucracy. A phased, legally mandated Skills and Integrity Audit of senior civil servants, overseen by the Public Service Commission, should be launched, with clear benchmarks, retraining and regular reviews.
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Coalition politics is not about ideological triumph, but deliverable results – rebuilding Eskom, fixing Transnet, unclogging ports, revitalising public education, etc. These are tasks that transcend partisan lines. No coalition can function without a competent, apolitical bureaucracy. A phased, legally mandated Skills and Integrity Audit of senior civil servants, overseen by the Public Service Commission, should be launched, with clear benchmarks, retraining and regular reviews.
Despite the dysfunction, the GNU presents a singular opportunity if it is seized with seriousness. South Africa can harness this moment to realign its economic model and social contract through flagship GNU-aligned programmes. Instead of working in political silos, the GNU should long ago have established:
- A national infrastructure pact, using blended finance to overhaul logistics, ports and digital infrastructure;
- SME and localisation reform, including tax breaks for local manufacturers and revamped BEE to empower township entrepreneurs;
- A green industrialisation strategy, positioning the country as a continental leader in green hydrogen and renewables;
- A public service revival programme, recruiting a youth corps, retraining officials and restoring dignity to the civil service; and
- Quarterly joint budget reviews, issued by all GNU economic ministers to reassure markets and the public of unified fiscal governance.
The GNU is not a romantic experiment; it is a last, urgent rehearsal for democratic maturity. Its failure would not merely imperil the economy, but usher in a deeper erosion of constitutional faith. Already, whispers are growing louder about “benign dictators” and comparisons with Kagame’s Rwanda. These are not flippant comments; they are the murmurings of a people who are losing patience with our democratic constitutionalism. And yet, if the GNU succeeds, however precariously, it could mark the beginning of a new political culture, grounded not in liberation nostalgia or technocratic purism, but in competence, humility and the solidarity of shared nation-building.
Germany had decades to refine its coalitions. South Africa must do it in real time, dancing on a blade while the storm howls. But if the major players can learn restraint and if citizens insist on accountability, this fragile formation may yet chart the course from crisis to coherence. The world is watching. But more importantly, so are 60 million South Africans, hungry for progress, tired of slogans and desperate for politicians who choose country over self-interest.
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