Abstract
Fears about an impending Chinese invasion of Taiwan are mounting. On more than one occasion current and former USA officials have lamented the untenable strategic situation confronting Taiwan in the light of an increasingly assertive and powerful China, stressing the need for more concerted American action to deter any Chinese move to grab Taiwan. Some American officials, with the former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as the pre-eminent example, have forthrightly declared that the US should formally recognise Taiwan as a country, a move that would surely irk China or, worse still, provide the spark for World War III. Fears about an impending Chinese invasion of Taiwan are not groundless. China possesses the military capabilities to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, albeit at an exceptionally high cost to China’s interests and position in the international system, and these capabilities will only increasing in the future. For China the issue of Taiwan’s unification with the mainland is non-negotiable. The strategic realities of an economically and militarily more powerful China and, conversely, a declining US, are likely to pose severe – possibly existential – challenges to Taiwan.
The objective of this article is to highlight the increasingly grim external situation confronting Taiwan (today but even more so in the future) and to consider the nuclear option as the best safeguard against a Chinese invasion and, concomitantly, the surest way to guarantee Taiwanese survival in a hostile world. The primary research question of this study is: Given the increasingly desperate and hostile external situation confronting Taiwan, which strategic route is likely to be feasible and effective in protecting Taiwan from a Chinese invasion and, concomitantly, guaranteeing Taiwan’s survival? In short, in the light of China’s unwavering commitment to uniting Taiwan with the mainland and growing Chinese military capabilities to act on its desires, what strategic action should the government in Tapei be taking? The primary research question is supported by two subsidiary research questions: Is conventional deterrence likely to be feasible and effective in guaranteeing Taiwan’s security and survival? And can nuclear weapons guarantee Taiwan’s security and survival and is such a path likely to be feasible and effective in the Taiwanese context? The study is located within a qualitative research paradigm and employs an integrative literature review. Accordingly, the study is based on a literature study of the strategic position of China vis-à-vis the USA on the one hand (today and in the future) and the stabilising and peace-inducing effects of nuclear weapons (as espoused by two leading scholars of nuclear weapons: Kenneth Waltz and Bernard Brodie) on the other. The conclusion reached from this analysis is that Taiwan’s desire to do whatever it takes to provide for its security and survival may very well constrain Taipei to tread the necessary, albeit undesirable, path towards nuclear weapons, a path that provides the best guarantee for ensuring Taiwanese survival and security.
Four key findings buttress this conclusion.
Firstly, there can be very little doubt about the centrality of Taiwan for Beijing or about Chinese resolve to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Although China stresses the desirability of peaceful reunification with Taiwan, Chinese President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that the “historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled”, an endeavour that does not rule out the use of military force. For Beijing, Taiwan undoubtedly forms part of its broader revisionist and expansionist agenda in East Asia, but there is more to this than brute strategic considerations. Taiwan constitutes “sacred territory” for Beijing, which ultimately means that the question of reunification is wedded to Chinese nationalism, a potent driver of war in international politics. Today, China’s rhetoric on the necessity and inevitability of reunifying with Taiwan is becoming increasingly frequent and boisterous. While the question of reunification has always been central to Beijing’s future ambitions, they have for decades lacked the military and economic power – and the attendant political will – to act on it, a predicament that is becoming something of the past. The increasingly aggressive posture of China – in Southeast Asia generally and towards Taiwan particularly – plays itself out against the backdrop of its rapid increase in military and economic might, which has caused China to see itself and the world in starkly different terms. As with other great powers in centuries past, China increasingly sees itself as the pick and flower among ations, destined to become the natural leader of the world. While seeing the US as a declining power, China sees itself as destined to lead and as it continues to rise, to fashion the international system according to its liking. Armed with an increasingly lofty vision of itself and backed by its increasing economic and military might, China’s reunification with Taiwan appears to be less a matter of “if” and more a matter of “when”.
Secondly, fears abound and uncertainties multiply when the military dimension of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan is considered. Does China have the military capability – and if not today, then will it have it tomorrow – to take Taiwan? Will the US come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese invasion? What about Taiwan’s resolve and capability in defending itself against such an invasion? What if China were to pursue unification with Taiwan by employing methods just short of full-scale conventional war, e.g. a military blockade? In considering these questions, and in finding answers to them, the study concludes that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is feasible today, albeit at an inordinately high cost to China’s strategic interests and position in the international system. When looking at the future, however, things look particularly gloomy for Taiwan. In the light of America’s declining strategic position on the one hand, and the growing Chinese military and economic might on the other hand (coupled with the reality that China’s military is training with an eye towards launching a successful amphibious operation), Taiwan’s future looks particularly grim.
Thirdly, and reinforcing the desperate external situation confronting Taiwan, there is no guarantee that the US can and, more importantly, will successfully defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. China’s military and economic might dwarfs that of Taiwan. This is one side of the coin that both China and Taiwan surely understand. For years, however, Taipei could draw comfort from the fact that the US – the indisputable hegemon in the post-World War II era – could (but not necessarily would) rush to Taiwan’s defence against a Chinese invasion. Although the official US policy remains one of “strategic ambiguity”, and one often hears US officials declaring (but then quickly retracting) their willingness to aid Taiwan in repelling a Chinese invasion, the harsh reality is that the US has never been all that serious about prioritising Taiwan’s interests. With this in mind we would do well to consider US behaviour and not rhetoric. Successive US administrations have variously signalled to Beijing their willingness to make concessions over Taiwan. For Beijing, as against this as against this reunification with Taiwan has always been non-negotiable.
Finally, the nature of international politics constrains states to take care of themselves as best they can, a reality that often means treading paths that might not be all that desirable. Each state must take care of itself as best it can, there scarcely being anyone else to rely on. While the US could (but not necessarily would) come to Taiwan’s defence, Taiwanese officials and defence experts appreciate that Taipei needs to prepare for a future without the US. Although Taiwan is pursuing various strategies to bolster its defences, and even if the Americans were to voice their willingness to come to Taiwan’s rescue in the event of a Chinese invasion, the history of international politics shows that conventional deterrent strategies are hardly sufficient to dissuade a state from launching a campaign of aggression. For various reasons, conventional deterrence will not suffice for a Chinese invasion. What remains is the nuclear option. While various other options might indeed be preferable, the harsh reality is that nuclear weapons provide the best guarantee to deter large-scale war – i.e., two or more nuclear-armed states will steer clear of a full-scale conventional or nuclear war with each other. While not without risks, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence provide the most prudent course of action for Taiwan – not a solution, I should add, but a trade-off.
Obviously, questions may arise about the requirements of deterrence, the difficulty of creating credible nuclear forces and the reality that any Taiwanese nuclear force will be outmatched (qualitatively and quantitatively) by China’s strategic forces. The study indicates, however, that concerns over the credibility of small nuclear forces (as Taiwan’s nuclear force is likely to be) are misplaced – creating invulnerable second-strike forces is not overly difficult. Likewise, in a nuclear world, with both parties possessing second-strike forces, comparisons become pointless. The possible retaliatory use of nuclear force by Taiwan, not the strategic balance of force, is what ultimately counts. Chinese calculations of danger, and the question of whose will is likely to predominate, are unaffected by the balance or imbalance of strategic forces.
In charting a future for their country, Taiwan’s leaders might very well prefer not to go nuclear. In fact, a recent referendum championed by Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), in which voters were asked to consider restarting a mothballed nuclear plant, suffered a serious defeat. It appears that the current Taiwanese government has little appetite for nuclear power, let alone nuclear weapons. This notwithstanding, the harshness of international political life suggests that states’ leaders are often constrained to think less in terms of wants and more in terms of needs. Ultimately, as Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen has conceded, Taiwan will do whatever it takes to ensure its survival. While the government in Taipei might prefer various paths, including dialogue and negotiation, to the nuclear one, the external environment hardly lends itself to such avenues today. In the future, with China sure to grow more powerful economically and militarily, such paths might be well near impossible to tread. Again, while dialogue and negotiation are indeed important and undoubtedly preferable, I would not bet on them as the best means to guarantee Taiwan’s survival. A friendlier China tomorrow (admittedly, an unlikely possibility) might become more belligerent sometime later. A prudent Taiwan, wishing to survive, would do well to consider the nuclear option. For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons remain the best bet for weak states – including Taiwan – to ensure their survival.
Keywords: China; conventional power; deterrence; nuclear deterrence; nuclear war; nuclear weapons; realism; Taiwan; Taiwan Strait; USA
• The featured image by Thomas Tucker with this article was obtained from Unsplash.
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