Litnet

Iran’s ballistic missile barrages on Israel, numbering at least 180 missiles, on Tuesday, 1 October 2024, has once again stoked fears that a broader conflict is at hand. More alarmingly, arguments that an Israel-Iran conflagration could be the spark for World War III are not unprecedented. A dramatic and dangerous escalatory spiral seems to be unfolding in that region of the world, with some fearing and claiming that the likelihood of de-escalation is alarmingly dim. Accordingly, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed that Israel will retaliate. Iran, Netanyahu noted, will “pay for it”. For its part, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has warned that any Israeli retaliation will be met with “crushing attacks”. Meanwhile, the United States has rallied behind Israel, endorsing Israel’s right to self-defence, while emphasising that any Iranian attack on US targets (given that there are several US military bases in the region) will result in “severe consequences” for Iran. While giving its support for Israel’s right to self-defence, the Biden administration has been unequivocal that it would not support any Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, a possible (though unlikely) target of an Israeli retaliatory attack.

Iran’s missile attack: Escalatory or de-escalatory?

Analysts and observers of these events have been quick to argue that Iranian retaliation presents a classic case of an irrational Iranian regime bent on escalation. Accordingly, the launch of some 180 ballistic missiles is offered as compelling evidence that Iran wishes to escalate and that its retaliatory attack was a massive show of force. Contrary to such views, I see in the Iranian missile barrage evidence not of escalation, but of impressive moderation. Some context is required here. In the wake of the devastating pager attacks, presumably launched by Israeli intelligence, in which thousands of pagers used by Lebanon-based Hezbollah exploded, killing some 3 000 members and a senior IRGC commander, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered an attack on Israeli targets to exact revenge on Israel. Importantly, Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian opted to disregard Khamenei’s order, with some Iranian officials citing noticeable differences within the government regarding the proposed attack. Eventually, Khamenei’s instruction predominated, with Iran subsequently opting to launch roughly 180 missiles directed at mostly military and security targets in Israel. Tellingly, it stands to reason that the Iranian leadership would have calculated that most of the missiles launched, including the Fatteh-2 hypersonic weapon (capable of reaching a maximum speed of roughly 16 098 kilometres per hour) and scores of ballistic missiles, would, in fact, not reach Israeli targets, owing to the highly effective missile defence system employed by Israel. Although Israeli and Iranian accounts differ concerning the damage wrought by the missiles that did indeed evade Israeli missile defence systems, the important point to note is that Iran would surely have known that a much larger missile barrage would be required to penetrate the Israeli missile defence and wreak great devastation. The Iranian goal, accordingly, was de-escalatory, marked by moderation and restraint. Notice also the Iranian response in the wake of the attacks, as stated by the Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi: “Our action is concluded unless the Israeli regime decides to invite further retaliation. In that scenario, our response will be stronger and more powerful.” Such measures and actions hardly speak of a desire to escalate. Instead, Iran wanted to send an unequivocal message to Israel (to wit, that Israel’s behaviour won’t be tolerated by Iran).

Understanding Iranian foreign policy

Many of the fears about a wider regional war and, concomitantly, the claims about Iran’s desire to escalate stem from a deeply held belief, in Western security circles, that Iranian leaders are uniquely irrational and undeterrable. Over the last decade or so, we have often been warned about the “mad Ayatollahs” in Iran or, as Benjamin Netanyahu has once said, the “lunatics” who constitute Iranian leadership, and have been told that Iranian leaders cannot and will not act rationally. While it is undoubtedly true that Iran constitutes the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world, and while Tehran is the driving force behind Hamas, Hezbollah and their ilk, the history of Iranian foreign policy indicates that Iran’s leaders – like those of other states – are sensitive to costs and constitute “perfectly sane” Ayatollahs bent on survival. Some examples are in order. During 2019, amid a devastating sanctions regime imposed by Western nations on Iran and with the US threatening to end waivers on Iranian oil exports (central to the Iranian economy), Iran threatened that it would close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat often made by that state but of which little has come. In calculating its course of action, Iran undoubtedly estimated that it would be prudent to avoid provoking the US and incurring a likely swift and devastating American response. Likewise, despite the oft-heard rhetoric of unprecedented violence and chants of “Death to America” following the Trump administration-sanctioned killing during 2019 of the head of the IRGC-Qods Force, Major General Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian regime has acted in calculated and moderate ways, choosing to respond mostly with a barrage of ballistic missiles aimed at US military bases in Iraq. Here, as in the more recent Iranian missile attacks on Israel (April and October 2024), the severity of the attacks hardly matched the heated rhetoric, the religious fervour and the promises to unleash all hell on earth.

Is Iranian state-sponsored terror not evidence of its risk-taking behaviour?

Iranian support of terrorist groups and proxies in the region has often been presented as evidence that the regime is uniquely irrational, undeterrable and wholly given to ideology (or religious fanaticism) rather than pragmatism. That there are religious zealots in Iranian leadership wishing to wipe Israel and other Western nations off the map cannot be denied. But this is not the whole story, and these religious hard-liners’ voices have often been drowned out by more moderate voices. Viewing Iranian state-sponsorship of terrorism as uniquely irrational, undeterrable and void of any pragmatism, is fundamentally flawed – and wholly anachronistic. Instead, the Iranian regime’s “relatively activist foreign policy” is much more directed at avoiding direct confrontation (consider that the two direct attacks on Israel are exceptions, not the norm), employing surrogate forces or utilising covert means, all of which aims to uphold a position of plausible deniability. Tellingly, plausible deniability is a risk-mitigation strategy that underscores the Tehran regime’s ability to think and act strategically. The strategy is designed to avoid war. Political scientists Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran, in considering Iran’s support of terrorism and proxy wars, have likewise noted that such support is based on “calculated risk-taking” embedded within a “pragmatic approach that considers strategic cost-benefit calculations”. Apparently even the Iranians are rational and sensitive to costs, although one would be hard-pressed to find such views being aired in the (mainstream) media. In cases where Iran does take bolder actions, such as the 14 September 2019 attacks on two Saudi Arabian oil facilities or the unprecedented direct attacks on Israel in 2024, risk management remains of overriding importance to Tehran. Notice, once again, how the Iranian foreign minister stressed that Iran’s retaliation “concluded” their action. In cases where war becomes necessary for Iran, as Michael Eisenstadt has noted, “Tehran will seek to minimise costs” – behaviour that hardly creates the impression of a regime immune to risk calculation and bent on unleashing all hell in the region.

Concluding thoughts

Understanding the recent attacks launched by Iran against Israeli targets and, concomitantly, the spectre of a broader conflict requires engaging with a wider history of Iranian foreign policy. While the threat and possibility of war is always possible, we must be leery of overly emphasising what leaders say and pay more attention to what they do. Accordingly, while the heated (religious) rhetoric coming from Tehran does cause concern, we would do well to consider the political constraints impacting upon Iranian foreign policy as well. In gazing at the history of Iranian foreign policy, one is likely to find far more cautious and moderate behaviour than is often presumed. Given Iran’s sensitivity to costs and, importantly, the fact that Israel is a nuclear weapons state, we can expect any Iranian action to remain cautious, marked by intense moderation. Accordingly, as noted above, the striking feature of Iran’s missile barrage has not been its escalatory logic but its moderation. Let us hope that the leaders on both sides will see the clear and present dangers of war and avoid the errors of miscalculation that that inveterate human condition – ie, hubris – often brings.