China is using military training exercises with African forces to enhance its expeditionary capabilities and geostrategic goals.
China’s two-week military exercises in Tanzania and Mozambique in July and August 2024 marked a significant expansion of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engagement in Africa. The battalion-sized Chinese deployment (around 1 000 troops) conducted land and sea training, including maritime patrols, search and rescue, and live-fire drills under “Peace Unity”. The exercises involved approximately two dozen types of weapons and equipment, including small arms, heavy artillery, micro drones and various reconnaissance and infantry vehicles.
PLA ground, naval, air and marine forces participated. The PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, created to streamline the PLA’s expeditionary capacity, and the Information Support Force were featured for the first time. Chinese troops were transported from mainland China using various transportation vehicles, including the Y-20 strategic transport aircraft and Yuzhao-class amphibious landing docks.
Peace through unity: Displaying the PLA’s power
In past drills, the PLA’s deployments were limited to Djibouti or antipiracy patrols. However, the Tanzania exercises marked a significant step up in distance, compared with previous ones, such as in Belarus. The sea phase involved manoeuvres off Mozambique’s coast, while the land phase took place at the Chinese-built Comprehensive Training Centre (CTC) in Mapinga, Tanzania. The exercises featured unscripted opposing force elements, combined arms manoeuvres and amphibious shore landings. Overall, Peace Unity demonstrated the PLA’s growing capability to deploy infantry, armour, artillery and support units over long distances, emphasising Africa’s role as a proving ground for their operations.
The PLA in Africa: Enhancing China’s geostrategic vision
China’s “Go Out” strategy and “New Historic Missions” guidance have significantly influenced the PLA’s doctrine and modernisation. Enacted as a national strategy in 2000, Go Out supports state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in relocating abroad to secure new markets and resources. It has also paved the way for initiatives such as the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
By 2017, over 10 000 Chinese firms, mostly SOEs, were operational in Africa. This includes 62 port projects and roughly $700 billion worth of debt-financed BRI contracts between 2013 and 2023. The growing presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Africa has expanded the PLA’s strategic, doctrinal and training scenarios. The 2004 New Historic Missions guidance instructs the PLA to “strengthen and defend Chinese overseas capabilities and interests”. This is outlined in defence white papers such as “Diversified employment of China’s armed forces” (2013), “China’s military strategy” (2015) and “China’s national defence in the new era” (2019).
The New Historic Missions focus on three military goals by 2030: first, to prevent foreign forces’ access and movement in the western Pacific’s first and second island chains, covering areas like the Yellow, East China and South China Seas and including islands such as the Kuril and Ryukyu archipelagos, Borneo, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The second goal is to enhance China’s global public goods delivery, including peacekeeping, antipiracy and disaster response, which the PLA calls “diversified tasks”. These efforts aim to position China as a responsible great power. The third goal is to protect overseas interests and operational capabilities, such as infrastructure, energy, sea lanes and Chinese nationals. This includes using military and civilian assets to evacuate citizens from places like Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan and Sudan.
China’s expanded African engagements align with its global ambitions. When FOCAC started in 2000, China had no peacekeepers in Africa and lagged behind the United States and Europe in training African students and professionals. There was no Chinese security assistance, and China was not involved in African security discussions.
The PLA’s largest overseas deployment is in Africa, where it maintains permanent naval flotillas and has more troops in United Nations missions than any other permanent Security Council member. Apart from France, China trains the most African students, as well as training many African civilian, military and law enforcement professionals.
FOCAC, initially focused on trade, now includes military aspects such as training quotas, military sales credits, and capacity-building for peacekeeping and counterterrorism. It also hosts security dialogues like the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum and the China-Africa Police and Law Enforcement Forum, funds the African Union’s Africa Standby Force, and promotes Chinese security norms through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative.
The PLA’s increasing role in FOCAC highlights the militarisation of China’s Africa policy. Similarly, China’s other regional forums, like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) and the China-Latin American States Forum (CELAC), have developed military programmes over time, following FOCAC’s model.
Steady expansion of the PLA’s combat capabilities in Africa
Since 2000, China’s armed forces have conducted 19 military exercises, 44 naval port calls and 276 senior defence exchanges in Africa, as recorded by the database of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the US National Defense University. Additionally, China has deployed 24 military and civilian medical teams on one- to two-year rotations across 48 countries.
Initially, China’s military exercises on the continent featured low levels of military content, emphasising political signalling, military diplomacy, and familiarisation with Africa’s security environment. An example of this is “Peace Angel”, China’s first drill, held in June 2009 in Gabon, which focused on humanitarian medical evacuation and demonstrated a light footprint approach.
The engagements increased in 2014 with exercises in Nigeria (May), Namibia (June) and Cameroon (July), concentrating on fleet formation, antipiracy and rescue operations. These drills coincided with port calls by the PLA Navy’s 16th Escort Task Group (ETG).
Subsequently, the frequency and intensity of drills have accelerated. A notable instance is “Beyond 2014”, a month-long exercise conducted in October 2014 between Chinese and Tanzanian marines on the high seas and involving over 100 PLA marines, its largest deployment at the time.
A gradual expansion of infrastructure to expand the PLA’s power in Africa
Another significant development was the four-day drill conducted by the PLA Navy’s 22nd Escort Task Group (ETG) and the South African Navy in May 2016, which focused on warfighting. China deployed the Type 052 guided-missile destroyer Qingdao, the Type 054A frigate Daqing and the Type 903A replenishment ship Taihu for the exercise. South Africa participated with the frigate SAS Amatola and the submarine SAS Manthatisi. Although this was the fourth occasion that South Africa had hosted a PLA Navy ETG, it was the first time they had trained together at sea. To highlight the event’s importance, Admiral Wu Shengli, commander of the PLA Navy, observed the drill along with his South African counterpart.
China opened a naval base in Djibouti in 2017, enhancing its expeditionary capabilities. Initially, Chinese officials denied military intentions for the civilian port, and later minimised the base’s military significance by highlighting peacekeeping, counterterrorism and antipiracy efforts. However, terms like “power projection” and “improved out-of-area operations” frequently appear in discussions about the base.
The 2018-2019 training cycle saw increased PLA drills, likely due to the base’s improved access and logistics. In 2018 alone, the PLA conducted six exercises in Africa with Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria (twice) and South Africa.
China has also participated in other multinational exercises. Exercise Eku Kugbe, hosted by Nigeria in May 2018, focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. China deployed the Type 054 frigate Yenchang to join 12 Nigerian warships and one each from Cameroon, France, Ghana and Togo. Exercise Mosi, held in November 2019, involved China, Russia and South Africa for the first time for maritime security drills. This included surface gunnery, helicopter cross-deck landings, rescue of hijacked vessels, and disaster control. South Africa and China deployed a frigate each. South Africa also deployed naval aircraft and a fleet replenishment ship, SAS Drakensberg. Russia deployed a Slava-class cruiser, Marshall Ustinov, a sea-going tanker and a rescue tug, Vyazma.
Later in 2019, 300 troops from the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s 73rd Group Army arrived at Tanzania’s CTC for a 25-day exercise, “Sincere Partners 2019”. Tanzanian and Chinese ground forces participated in activities including a live-fire exercise, civilian search and rescue, unmanned aerial vehicle tactics, blasting operations, built-up area search and rescue, and a command post simulation. It was the largest drill of its kind conducted by the PLA at that time.
This activity resumed in 2023 after a pause during the lockdown. Exercise “Mosi II”, held in February off South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal coast, coincided with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia deployed a frigate equipped with Zircon hypersonic missiles. “Beyond 2023”, the third Sino-Tanzanian drill, took place in September, featuring mixed Chinese and Tanzanian task groups and integrated command and control. In June 2024, the PLA Navy’s 46th ETG participated in a Nigeria-hosted multinational counterpiracy drill featuring 10 warships from Brazil, Cameroon, China and Nigeria. This event built upon four previous Sino-Nigerian exercises since 2014 (two bilateral and two multilateral).
This analysis underscores that much of the infrastructure China is utilising to expand its military presence in Africa has been systematically developed over time. Notable Chinese-built facilities, such as Tanzania’s Kigamboni Naval Base and Ngerengere Air Force Base and the CTC in Mapinga, have all hosted PLA drills and military events. Additionally, Chinese-constructed ports in Cameroon, Ghana, Namibia and Nigeria have facilitated PLA Navy port visits preceding joint exercises. The PLA’s Peace Unity 2024 exercises, China’s largest to date, exemplify a gradual progression rather than an abrupt change in the militarisation of China’s Africa policy.
Perspectives from China and Africa
The PLA views Africa as a critical region for “far seas operations”. Senior Colonel (Ret) Zhou Bo, who led PLA antipiracy missions in Africa from 2009 to 2015, states:
If you ask me when the PLA Navy became a blue water navy, I would argue that it happened at the end of 2008, when PLA flotillas went to the Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy operations. This type of combat mission, although against pirates, was essentially a military operation conducted far from the Chinese coast, which involved continuous exercises. And it is still ongoing. After completing each mission in the Gulf of Aden, which typically lasted about three months, these ships would navigate around the world to become familiar with uncharted waters, such as the Atlantic Ocean, the Bering Sea and the Mediterranean. Consequently, these missions are no longer limited to three months; sometimes they can extend to ten months. This approach is how we have been making progress without engaging in warfare.
Low attention from the media and international powers
China benefits from the low priority accorded to Africa by the global media and major powers, facilitating the PLA’s expansion of its military presence in the region with minimal attention. China also capitalises on the extended deployment distances involved in its increased military engagements in Africa. This has been instrumental for power projection practice and experimentation, while offering the PLA realistic training opportunities within Africa’s complex security environment. The low priority given to Africa by international media and key global powers further allows China to advance its military footprint discreetly.
African governments justify their decision to cooperate with China’s military by highlighting the advantages of learning from a rapidly modernising PLA. However, opinions outside government circles are more critical. For instance, one Kenyan commentator described Peace Unity as a “covert plan by the Chinese to set up a military base within Tanzania”. A Tanzanian commentator expressed concerns that China’s growing military influence could alter Tanzania’s non-alignment stance, aligning it more closely with China’s geopolitical interests and potentially moving it away from the Non-Aligned Movement’s focus on disarmament and peace.
A sharpening paradox for Africa
China’s military strategy in Africa aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049”. The PLA is working toward being a “world-class force” by 2030, with capabilities to protect China’s global interests and win wars nearer to home. Some African countries support China’s militarisation for capacity-building, while others worry that partnerships may entangle Africa in unwanted geostrategic rivalries.
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