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Of the many objectives cited by the USA and Israel in launching Operation Epic Fury, destruction of a latent Iranian nuclear weapons capability remains paramount. Evidently, Operation Midnight Hammer, the joint US-Israel-launched attack aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities in June 2025, degraded, but did not destroy, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, with Tehran believed to have quickly rebuilt most of it. At best, Operation Midnight Hammer only partially destroyed the budding Iranian nuclear weapons capability; at worst, it probably affirmed the regime’s quest to go nuclear. Fast forward to today. President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have been unequivocal in stating that Iran will not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. In fact, Trump has been very consistent on this. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has repeatedly stated that an Iranian nuclear weapon would bring cataclysmic danger to Israel, the US and its allies, and the West in general. Such a capability, it is widely believed in the West, would be used to strike targets in Western cities (hence, be used for purposes of offence and not deterrence) and, furthermore, would provide a nuclear shield under which Iran’s reign of terror via its proxies in the region could flourish. Apparently, as Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has noted, it is common sense that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.

The spectre of a nuclear-armed Iran

The case for attacking Iran on the presumption that Tehran would not be a responsible custodian of nuclear weapons is, however, flawed. In this view, a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be deterred. Unlike other possessors of nuclear weapons, so it is believed, the Iranian leadership is irrational, crazy and fanatical – in short, nuclear deterrence won’t work in this case. Yet Washington’s perception of other nuclear weapons custodians – whether the Soviet Union, Russia today, North Korea or Pakistan – has hardly beamed with positive vibes. Certainly, Washington did not view the Soviets as rational and moderate during the heyday of the Cold War, and Russia, Pakistan and North Korea surely do not fit the bill today.  It is worth pointing out that in the context of a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and even in Washington’s strained relationship with North Korea, the hostilities run deep. Yet deterrence has worked in the past and continues to work today.

As often in the past, the durability of nuclear deterrence is assumed to rest on the rationality of leaders. Yet deterrence rests not on rationality but on fear. A nuclear-armed Iran, even a hate-spewing and fanatical one, would surely have appreciated that launching a nuclear weapon would yield unacceptable consequences for Tehran. Ultimately, the survival of the regime is the one thing the mullahs deeply cherish. The inevitability of retaliation in the face of an Iranian nuclear strike would have decisively ended fears about actual nuclear use. Of all the possible fears relating to a nuclear-armed Iran, a pre-emptive Iranian nuclear strike on Israel or other Western targets remains unthinkable. Unlike in a conventionally armed world, a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran would at least have had an incentive to discuss their problems, with each party understanding that mutual annihilation was no longer possible. “Death to Israel”, “Death to America”, although undoubtedly deeply desired by the Iranian regime, will have lost its sting.

A related concern, one voiced repeatedly by Trump administration officials, is the assumption that a nuclear weapon would provide Iran with a shield under which they could ramp up their support for proxies in the region. That Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terror is true. That the Iranian regime wishes to wipe Israel off the map is also indisputable. Yet the leap from these facts to the assumption of increased Iranian support for proxies in the region under a nuclear shield is farfetched. With or without a nuclear weapon, Iranian support for its vast proxy network in the region will continue. The fear appears to be this: A nuclear-armed Iran apparently believes that it can do whatever it wants through ramping up support for terrorists and proxies in the region, knowing that very few costs can be imposed upon it. In short, owing to its nuclear shield, Iran can do whatever the hell it wants to, and no one can do a damn thing about it. Nuclear weapons, however, have only one conceivable purpose, something that a nuclear-armed Iran would have quickly learned: deterrence against large-scale aggression. While deterring large-scale attacks focused on annihilating an enemy, nuclear weapons are not particularly useful in either bolstering or deterring low-level attacks. How a nuclear shield would have bolstered Iranian support of terror groups and proxies is, therefore, not explained. What tactical and strategic advantage would a nuclear shield have given Iran that it would not have without nuclear weapons? Could Iranian proxies shielded by an Iranian nuclear weapon have pressed Israel to the brink of destruction in ways that a conventionally armed Iran acting through its proxy network could not attempt to do? At any rate, if the nuclear record is anything to go by, a nuclear-armed Iran would have become more moderate in its external behaviour or, failing that, at least not become more adventurous. 

But what about the oft-cited fear of an Iranian nuclear weapon transferred to one of its proxies in the region? An Iranian nuclear weapon transferred to one of its proxies and then used by them in a strike on a Western target would surely have been traced back to Tehran. Ties between Iran and terrorist groups and proxies in the region are widely known. A nuclear terror attack by an Iranian proxy would immediately have resulted in everyone pointing their fingers at Iran, a fact that would not have been lost on Tehran. Here, as with the spectre of an Iranian nuclear strike on Israel or a Western target, deterrence would have continued to work its effects.

Hard lessons

All of this is not to deny that the Iranian regime has historically been at the forefront in sowing discord in the region and has advanced an agenda centred on ideological and religious fervour, death and destruction. Chants of “Death to Israel” and “Death to America” are not merely idle words voiced by Iranian hardliners – they mean them and the international community should take these hardliners at their word. At face value, an Iranian nuclear weapon appears to present to the Iranian regime the long-sought means to ensuring the final destruction of Israel and America; in reality, such a weapon would serve it with no other purpose than deterrence.

The case for Operation Epic Fury seems far more plausible when its objectives are exclusively framed on the basis of ridding the world of a dictator, destroying the Iranian regime’s support of its regional proxies, and destroying its large missile stockpiles. However, the case falls flat when Operation Epic Fury is justified on the basis of fears about living with a nuclear-armed Iran. Let me be frank: I believe that the world would be better off without the mullahs heading and directing the Iranian regime. But the case for launching Operation Epic Fury on the basis of fears that a nuclear-armed Iran is a uniquely dangerous prospect and an existential danger is flimsy at best; at worst, it is counterproductive and stands to undermine America’s position in the world. Unless the regime in Tehran changes, which without boots on the ground is unlikely to be the case, the Iranian regime will merely pick up where it left off by rebuilding its nuclear infrastructure and missile capabilities as evidenced by the Iranian response post-Operation Midnight Hammer. Contrary to Washington’s wishes and expectations, and in the absence of regime change, Operation Epic Fury is likely to strengthen Tehran’s resolve to go nuclear. If this is to be the outcome, the USA will have expended significant treasure and blood for nothing. Iran would claim victory and America’s actions would be viewed as a strategic blunder. And if Iran enters the nuclear club, America and Israel will be forced to learn the lesson that it should have understood from the start: America and the world can live with a nuclear-armed Iran.

Eben Coetzee is an associate professor of international relations at the University of the Free State, South Africa. His most recent work includes the edited volume The politics of nuclear energy in Africa: opportunities, fears and constraints, and he is the author of “Iran, the bomb and the spectre of (nuclear) terror” (in Directions in International Terrorism).