The rise of Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party) represents a confluence of ethnic mobilisation, false anti-capitalist sentiment, myopic pro-black advocacy, and purported resistance against Western influence.
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The political gods smiled at me when I chanced upon the MK Party Facebook Live session leading up to the first sitting of the seventh parliament of South Africa. By the time it concluded three hours later, despite being held during working hours, there were over 68 000 attendees. It was as serendipitous as fortuitous, especially considering I had accepted a brief to write an analysis unpacking the Zuma phenomenon.
The MK Party Live session focused on vague insinuations about rigging the recent elections and discussed various ideas to consolidate or seize power. Despite rambling about white monopoly capital, what stood out was a critical resolution to boycott banks such as Capitec and FNB – the former allegedly funds the Democratic Alliance, and Johan Rupert, of Stellenbosch mafia fame, owns the latter. Astron Energy (formerly Caltex) is also in their crosshairs, purportedly being owned by current ANC president Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa and Rupert. The slogan throughout the meeting was “Black money, black hands”. They were advised to stop sending hard-earned money to Western countries, particularly Germany, Britain and America, and instead look to Russia, Brazil and China. McDonald’s wasn’t spared because of claims that President Ramaphosa owns shares, though he sold his master franchise long ago. Even shopping for cars will change, as the MK lieutenants look to BRICS countries. “We must look to Russia. Starve the West of profits.” This was classic Zuma propaganda, blending facts with fiction.
Let’s track back to 1994–1999 when Zuma helmed the ANC KwaZulu-Natal province, a crucial battleground during South Africa’s first and second democratic elections. Both times, the so-called Zuma magic failed to materialise. The ANC lost to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in both elections. This dispelled the myth of Zuma’s invincibility as an organiser and “intelligence chief”, laying bare his political bankruptcy and inability to deliver electoral victories for the ANC without resorting to “counter-revolutionary” language.
We can trace Zuma’s shift towards naked ethnic mobilisation and anti-constitutionalism from 2005 to 2009, coinciding with his removal as the country’s deputy president by Thabo Mbeki and his subsequent legal troubles, including charges of corruption, money laundering and a high-profile rape trial. Zuma increasingly leaned on his ethnic roots to rally support, particularly among the Zulu-speaking population. This strategy was symbolised by the “100% Zulu Boy” T-shirts worn by his supporters, reflecting a deliberate move to galvanise Zulu ethnic solidarity in the face of political and legal adversity.
Truth be told, the signs were always there; as early as 2006, Zuma publicly described same-sex marriages as “a disgrace to the nation and God” during a Heritage Day celebration in his home province of KwaZulu-Natal. He frequently harangued the judiciary and the National Prosecuting Authority for arraigning him before the courts, a battle that persists to this day, 19 years later. Zuma also shut down the Scorpions, South Africa’s elite crime-fighting unit, in 2009, six months after assuming power.
Interestingly, the so-called Zuma factor benefited the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal only twice, in the 2009 and 2014 elections, even as overall ANC support dwindled nationally. In 2009, the ANC achieved an unassailable majority with 2 256 248 votes, translating to 64,0% in KwaZulu-Natal. In 2014, the numbers rose to 65,3%, with 2 530 827 votes. This improvement highlighted the impact of ethnic Zulu messaging even as Zuma’s broader appeal waned. However, after he was removed from the picture, the ANC’s support in the province dipped to 55,5% in the 2019 elections. This dichotomy underscores the simplicity of his ethnic political strategy.
However, the red flags of Zuma’s penchant for operating outside the rules and the Constitution were always evident. In 2015, he authorised the unprecedented payment of R7 010 per month for life to over 5 000 izinduna (headmen) without the National Treasury’s approval. Izinduna in KwaZulu-Natal are appointed by amakhosi and serve at their behest. It is neither a merit-based nor a full-time appointment, but rather a perfunctory role to assist each inkosi in discharging their duties. Before Zuma’s irregular intervention, which nearly collapsed the KwaZulu-Natal Treasury’s prudent financial management, izinduna had volunteered their services. This financial manoeuvre is reminiscent of the strategy he employed when he converted the National Student Financial Aid Scheme from a loan scheme to a bursary-only system during the Nasrec 1 (2017) ANC National Conference, aiming to swing the vote in favour of his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. These actions highlight Zuma’s consistent pattern of leveraging state financial incentives to secure personal pleasure at the expense of financial prudence. Schabir Shaik, Nkandla upgrades, the Gupta brothers saga and the broader state capture project, anyone?
During his years in the ANC, Zuma repeatedly attempted to undermine the Constitution. One of his most controversial efforts was the push to pass the Protection of State Information Bill, commonly known as the Secrecy Bill. It aimed to severely restrict press freedom and protect corrupt officials by making it illegal to disclose classified information, even if it was in the public interest. However, an even more ominous move was the attempted introduction of the Traditional Courts Bill, which would have required anyone under an inkosi to appear in a traditional court before approaching the Magistrate’s Court, thus bypassing the constitutional guarantee of legal counsel.
His views have grown increasingly extreme, such as suggesting the quarantining of young pregnant girls on Robben Island and advocating violence against ongqingili (gay men). Zuma has a history of making similar controversial statements and was forced to apologise to the people of South Africa on multiple occasions while still under the ANC.
The question before us is why Zuma has succeeded in upsetting the apple cart in 2024, despite numerous failed attempts in the past, including the 2021 Zuma unrest, which primarily affected the 2024 MKP strongholds in KwaZulu-Natal and parts of Gauteng.
I posit that two significant changes have recently taken place: the deaths of IFP founder Inkosi Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, long-time traditional prime minister; and the longest-serving Zulu King, His Majesty Zwelithini kaBhekuZulu. Their passing has left a vacuum and caused the Zulu royal family to rupture. The leadership provided by King Zwelithini and Inkosi Buthelezi has left a gaping hole.
Seeing this gap and recognising the need for assurance among the Zulu people that their monarchy would continue beyond Buthelezi’s demise, the cunning Zuma embarked on a door-to-door campaign to amakhosi and izinduna. He promised them political power in a parliamentary system rather than a constitutional democracy. Zuma referenced his revolutionary attempts to elevate traditional leadership through payments to izinduna and the scuppered Traditional Courts Bill. He presented himself as a saviour in the absence of a prominent Zulu leader.
Honestly speaking, IFP president Velenkosini Hlabisa is neither an inkosi nor a career politician, but a run-of-the-mill former councillor and schoolteacher. His background contrasts sharply with the traditional leadership roots historically associated with the IFP.
Amidst that cocktail of uncertainty, Zuma reintroduced his bizarre theories about the Constitution, claiming it is nothing but Roman-Dutch law used to subjugate black people. This anti-constitutional narrative and anti-Western sentiment became a cornerstone of Zuma’s political comeback, positioning him as a defender of African sovereignty and traditional values. For example, he has consistently argued since 2005 that Roman-Dutch law has stripped power away from traditional leaders (amakhosi) and given it to white men and a few politicians. He emphasised in 2024 that traditional leaders ruled peacefully before the colonial period and should have sovereign authority, similar to heads of state in other countries.
Put differently, Zuma revived Buthelezi’s pre-1994 messaging in 2023 with a blend of false pro-black advocacy, myopic rule-by-chiefs nonsense, and promises to wannabe politicians and tenderpreneurs of a return to rent-seeking practices reminiscent of the Gupta era. By tapping into a potent mix of ethnic loyalty, anti-Western sentiment and populist anti-capitalist rhetoric, he effectively consolidated his support base and reasserted his influence within a section of South African voters.
Furthermore, he convinced many within the construction mafia that if his party won the elections, they wouldn’t need to fight for a 30% stake in contracts because he would dismantle the white monopoly hold on government tenders. Since his removal from power, many tenderpreneurs and other figures in the now-defunct Radical Economic Transformation (RET) faction have struggled under the magnifying eye of the Special Investigating Unit, Special Tribunal, National Prosecuting Authority, and South African Revenue Service, which have been scrutinising irregularly awarded state contracts and money flows. Prominent figures involved in state capture, such as former Eskom chief Brian Molefe and former RET kingpin Ace Magashule, have also appeared in court on corruption charges.
Certainly, Zuma’s return to the political arena, greeted with cheers instead of jeers, does not signify that he is a messiah. Instead, he is akin to a half-naked emperor fighting back to retain his ill-gotten gains and to sustain the rent-seeking mob that has thrived under his patronage.
See also:
Kenners sê MK-party soek vis op droë grond vir verkiesingsbedrog
Kommentaar
Great article, very plausible case made for the reason why Zuma and MK have done so well. One wonders how Ramaphosa's not too thinly disguised warning to Zuma not to rock the boat will be received. Also intriguing to see the support he gives Russia.