Abstract
Proceeding from the assumption that the organisational transformation of any country’s military forces must take place in an orderly fashion, and must thus also be in line with existing laws, it is the purpose of this article to ascertain to what extent, and in which ways, the October 1899 structure of the Orange Free State’s armed forces was changed in the months following the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (11 October 1899) until mid-1900, and to what extent these changes were responsible for the July 1900 events, when a large Orange Free State (OFS) army surrendered without a fight in the Brandwater Basin. In particular, the role played by General Christiaan R. de Wet and President M.T. Steyn is scrutinised.
When the war broke out, at least 30 000 Transvaal (i.e. Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek; ZAR) burghers and approximately 20 000 Orange Free State (OFS) burghers were called to arms in the fight for republican independence against the British Empire. As is well-known, the Boer armies initially successfully beat back the British forces, but Lord Roberts’s indirect strategy led to a positive reversal of the British Army’s fortunes and the concomitant capture of Bloemfontein, the OFS’s capital, on 13 March 1900. The Free State forces were consequently withdrawn from the Cape Colony, and many of them fell back further northwards via the Eastern OFS. By mid-July 1900, a large Free State army was concentrated in the Brandwater Basin, i.e. between Fouriesburg, Bethlehem and present-day Clarens.
In an effort to structure and provide leadership in the Boer commando system, a rank structure was developed in the course of the years leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. As far as the Free State’s armed forces were concerned, the state president was both the official commander-in-chief (“opperbevelhebber”) and the commander-in-chief-in-the-field; i.e. chief officer commanding in the field (“opperbevelvoerder”). Chief commandants (in practice usually referred to as generals) commanded large units, sometimes referred to as “krygsafdelings” (armies) of the armed forces. In each army-in-the-field (“krygsafdeling”), there were a number of commandants (each commanding burghers from a particular town or district in the OFS), and each commandant had a number of field-cornets under his command.
Until January 1900 (i.e. in a period when the Boer forces were relatively successful), each chief commandant mainly operated in his own designated operational area. However, after the Free State forces fell back from the Cape Colony, and after Bloemfontein was occupied by the British Army, several chief commandants found themselves grouped together in armies that were patched together. In an effort to eliminate personality clashes and ensure proper command and control, the OFS president should, ideally, have taken overall command in the field, or should have united the commandos and facilitated the election of either a new chief commandant or – in line with the Transvaal’s rank structure – a commandant-general. However, the OFS laws with regard to this kind of intervention by the Free State’s president were ambiguous, and no sources could be found that clearly indicate whether or not M.T. Steyn in practice amended any law or issued a proclamation which would legally have enabled him to intervene. In the meantime, at a council-of-war meeting that was held at Kroonstad on 17 March 1900, the Boers decided to resort to mobile (i.e. guerrilla) warfare. On 31 March 1900, at the battle at Sannaspos, General Christiaan de Wet proved to be an expert exponent of this kind of warfare, and thus rose to further prominence as a Boer commander.
By July 1900, there were three “krygsafdelings” in the Eastern Free State, each with its own chief commandant. However, as early as 19 April 1900, either President M.T. Steyn or the OFS military commission (“krygskommissie”) appointed Christiaan de Wet as chief commandant of the Free State forces; but the legality of the appointment can be questioned, and it is not clear whether the appointment was (legally) finalised. However, General Jan Smuts was sure that De Wet had legally been appointed “to the chief position in the Free State Army”. But why did Steyn not officially inform the Free State’s Executive Council of the appointment, and why was the appointment not published in the government gazette?
Steyn should have asked the combined “krygsafdelings” in the Eastern Free State to elect a new chief commandant. Sources indicate that De Wet was uncomfortable about the legality of his appointment, and consequently asked Steyn for an election to be held. Steyn refused the request, but De Wet nevertheless continued with the election process and was subsequently elected as chief commandant in the third week of June 1900. However, other senior OFS officers, including Marthinus Prinsloo, continued to command forces with the rank of chief commandant; as a matter of fact, in due course, commandos elected additional chief commandants, for example, F.J.W.J. Hattingh.
To address the abovementioned issue, De Wet appointed combat generals (“veggeneraals”) in the place of chief commandants, but this complicated matters even further and led to more confusion. The rank of combat general did not appear in OFS laws governing the republic’s armed forces, and in due course, De Wet appointed these combat generals in the position of assistant chief commandants – a rank that he created and which, once again, was not to be found in Free State legislation.
In the period October 1899 to July 1900, the way in which the Boers allocated ranks became increasingly confusing, which in turn affected their actions, or lack of purposeful actions. This had negative consequences for the Boer war effort, as clearly illustrated by the events that took place in the Brandwater Basin at the end of July 1900. While British forces approached the Basin and soon occupied all the entrances to the Basin, the senior officers of the trapped Boer forces argued amongst themselves as to who was officially in overall command, instead of breaking out – as De Wet, Steyn and about 2 000 men did on 15 July 1900. On 29 July, Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo negotiated terms of surrender with Lieutenant-General Archibald Hunter. By 9 August 1900, three Boer generals (chief commandants), nine commandants and 4 314 burghers were prisoners of war. By surrendering such a large force without putting up any resistance, Prinsloo and his accomplices dealt the Free State forces (and Boers in general) a blow from which they did not recover. The war dragged on for another 22 months, leaving large areas devastated, and tens of thousands of white and black civilians dead in internment camps – and both the OFS and ZAR lost their republican independence.
Keywords: Anglo-Boer War; Brandwater Basin; General C.R. de Wet; Orange Free State Boer military forces; President M.T. Steyn