Abstract
Operation Savannah, the South African Defence Force (SADF) military intervention in Angola (October 1975–March 1976), failed to achieve the South African government’s political objective of preventing the communist-leaning MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) from gaining sole control of Angola. The government’s hopes for substantial American political and military support for its anticommunist campaign were dashed by strong opposition in Congress to President Ford’s request for funding of military intervention in Angola. The SADF operation achieved its objective of supporting the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) to hold on to the parts of Angola which were under their control. However, with the help of Soviet-armed Cuban troops, the MPLA repelled the SADF assault on the Angolan capital, Luanda, and after an OAU vote in its favour became the recognised Angolan government. Thereafter the SADF withdrew from Angola.
Operation Savannah had far-reaching military, diplomatic, political and economic consequences for the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The international community condemned the apartheid state’s violation of the international law principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state. A United Nations Security Council resolution to this effect was adopted without opposition by its Western members. The Angolan invasion was a setback for prime minister John Vorster’s policy of détente in Southern Africa which lost the support of moderate African leaders. The SADF’s shortcomings were exposed and the image of South Africa as the strongman of Africa was damaged. The position of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) was strengthened, and these liberation movements took courage that apartheid was not invincible.
Although Vorster and his minister of defence, P.W. Botha, were guilty of autocratic decision-making and their authorisation to invade Angola was a serious blunder in retrospect, they succeeded in convincing conservative white voters that they had acted correctly in opposing communist expansion. They used the idea of a “total onslaught”, formulated by Botha in defence white papers, to incite fear of a “communist” and “terrorist” threat to the country’s security and led their supporters to believe that they were engaged in a fight for survival. Afraid that they would be branded as unpatriotic, the leaders of the parliamentary opposition parties (the United Party and Progressive Reform Party) were hesitant in their criticism of Operation Savannah. At the ballot box, the ruling National Party (NP) won a record victory in the 1977 elections.
This article focuses on the economic consequences of Operation Savannah. The operation cost a lot of money, according to official figures almost R200 million and according to other unverified sources much more. The direct costs of the operation caused the defence budgets for 1975/76 and 1976/77 to be exceeded. P.W. Botha used the weakened security position of the RSA after Operation Savannah as leverage to negotiate with the Cabinet for a drastic increase in the defence budget. He wanted to strengthen the SADF’s military presence on the northern border of South West Africa. He also wanted to upgrade the military capability of the SADF by increasing the permanent force, expanding the conscription system and expanding the South African arms manufacturing industry. Although the monetary position in the Treasury was not such that all Botha’s requests could be met, the Cabinet nevertheless approved a substantial increase in the defence budget which caused a spike in government expenditure. The amount allocated to the Department of Defence in the 1976/77 budget (R1 350 million) was 40 per cent higher than the previous year.
In the 1977/78 financial year defence expenditure reached a peak of more than 5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 19 per cent of total government expenditure. The minister of finance had to channel additional funds to the military through the reallocation of budget funds.
The drastic increase in military spending during the remainder of the apartheid period to strengthen the SADF and continue the “bush war” against the liberation movements put enormous pressure on the state coffers. Both the expansion of military capacity and preparedness and the counter-insurgency operations cost a lot of money, as much as R32,5 billion in 1989 according to unverified sources. A committee, appointed by the minister of finance to investigate the implications for the country’s economy of the increased defence budget, found that the defence spending had further hampered the already struggling economy and asked whether the military threat was so serious that the economic sacrifices that would be necessitated by increased defence spending could be justified. Excessive military spending was not the only factor, but one of the major factors identified by economists that weakened the South African economy. Social spending had to be cut in favour of defence spending. At a time when the South African economy was already in recession, excessive government spending, to which military expenditure made a significant contribution, accelerated the downward spiral of the South African economy. This caused inflation to rise out of control and adversely affected the balance of payments.
The international literature on military financing points out the disadvantages of excessive defence spending. Economists have used econometric tools to try to determine the impact of military spending on the South African economy. They have indicated that incomplete data on the extent of military spending makes it difficult to quantify this impact accurately. Yet the consensus among researchers was that high defence spending had a negative impact on the economy. Thus, econometric research confirms that military spending hurt the South African economy.
Ultimately, the country’s economic predicament was one of the most important factors why F.W. de Klerk decided to negotiate with the ANC about ending apartheid shortly after taking power. My argument is therefore that the economic consequences of Operation Savannah were a major trigger for the beginning of the end of apartheid.
Keywords: Angola; apartheid state; MPLA; Operation Savannah; South African Defence Force; SWAPO
- This article’s featured image was created by Safi Erneste and obtained from Pexels.
Lees die volledige artikel in Afrikaans
Operasie Savannah: Die "ligte mistykie" wat die apartheidstaat ekonomies geknou het