Ongelukkig is die moontlikheid baie groot dat ons sal faal in van ons pogings indien die volgende insig oor redevoering in oorweging gebring word en daar na die werk van Mercier and Dan Sperber verwys word.
Die volgende word as kerngedagtes daaruit aangebied.
Reasoning is generally seen as a mean to improve knowledge and make better decisions. Much evidence, however, shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests rethinking the function of reasoning. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.
Psychologists have shown that people have a very, very strong, robust confirmation bias. What this means is that when they have an idea, and they start to reason about that idea, they are going to mostly find arguments for their own idea. They’re going to come up with reasons why they’re right, they’re going to come up with justifications for their decisions. They’re not going to challenge themselves.
And the problem with the confirmation bias is that it leads people to make very bad decisions and to arrive at crazy beliefs. And it’s weird, when you think of it, that humans should be endowed with a confirmation bias. If the goal of reasoning were to help us arrive at better beliefs and make better decisions, then there should be no bias. The confirmation bias should really not exist at all.
But if you take the point of view of the argumentative theory, having a confirmation bias makes complete sense. When you’re trying to convince someone, you don’t want to find arguments for the other side, you want to find arguments for your side. And that’s what the confirmation bias helps you do.
The idea here is that the confirmation bias is not a flaw of reasoning, it’s actually a feature. It is something that is built into reasoning; not because reasoning is flawed or because people are stupid, but because actually people are very good at reasoning — but they’re very good at reasoning for arguing. Not only does the argumentative theory explain the bias, it can also give us ideas about how to escape the bad consequences of the confirmation bias.
Hierdie bevestig die teenpool, die uitdaging wat bestaan om nie in bogenoemde slagyster te trap nie en die omsigtigheid van die geleerde, die vakkundige, soos volg beskryf deur Steiner, “nuance and scruple” en hoe maklik dit is in teenstelling tot dit om te faal.
’n Laaste gedagte het met frustrasie te doen, die “woede”, “die onaangenaamheid” wat ervaar word, wanneer ’n argument wat aangebied word teenstand kry. Adam Phillips het ’n sinvolle argument oor die aard van frustrasie.
Phillips se argument is soos volg:
Net soos plesier of dan satisfaksie moontlik is, is dit egter, (ongelukkig) onlosmaakbaar deel van frustrasie. Plesier en frustrasie het sy oorsprong vanaf ’n enkele persoon, ’n enkele gebeurtenis. Hierdie is verteenwoordigend van die struktuur van realiteit en sal nooit verander nie. Maar daar is ’n fobie teen frustrasie en word daar gepoog om dit teen alle koste te vermy en kan dan die metodes gebruik om frustrasies soos ervaar die hier en elders dan die hoof te bied.
As ’n finale antwoord dan, beterweter of nie, ek hoop nie so nie, maar wel die volgende:
Opreg nuuskierig definitief.
Baie dankie
Wouter