In die wysbegeerte word gepoog om lig op moeilike probleme, insluitende (moontlik) onoplosbares, te werp en insig te bekom wat buite die vermoë van wetenskaplike ondersoek val. Die moeilikheidsgraad van baie hiervan is sodanig dat ’n mens die een geskiedenis van die wysbegeerte na die ander met vrug kan lees (SêNet, 23.11.2010). Dieselfde kan van inleidings tot die wysbegeerte gesê word, onder andere omdat die outeurs van latere publikasies by voorafgaandes baat gevind het. Simon Blackburn se Philosophy (London: Quercus, 2009, 208p) is so ’n publikasie (SêNet, 9.02.2010). Dit het in die uitgewersreeks Big Questions verskyn. Onlangs is daar met ’n soortgelyke uitgewersreeks, genaamd All That Matters, begin. Daarin is Julian Baggini se Philosophy (London: Hodder Education, 2012, 149p) gepubliseer.
Blackburn is ’n gerekende filosoof van Cambridge. Baggini is die skrywer van artikels vir vakkundige en ander gesaghebbende tydskrifte. Albei het ’n hele aantal boeke gepubliseer en hulle neem aan openbare gesprekke deel. Hulle doen die geykte beeld van die antieke Griekse filosoof op die markplein eer aan. In hierdie opsig is daar ’n verskil tussen die Britse en die plaaslike situasie. Dikwels ervaar ek die pogings van plaaslike wysgere, wat heel goed in die klaskamer kan vaar, as ’n verleentheid wanneer hulle as openbare intellektuele probeer funksioneer. Die goeie beeld van die wysbegeerte kan skade ly.
Wanneer die genoemde wegwysers van Blackburn en Baggini vergelyk word, val die groter seggingskrag en duidelikheid van laasgenoemde op. Baggini het ’n teks gelewer wat groter aanklank by leke behoort te vind. Hy doen dit sonder dat die onderwerp vakkundig skade ly. Vergelyk bv Blackburn se hoofstuk, "What is beauty?", met Baggini se "The value of art". Ook Blackburn se hoofstuk, "Am I free?", met Baggini se afdeling oor "Free will" (p 49-53). Baggini se vermoë om ingewikkelde kwessies duidelik te maak, herinner aan die geskrifte van Bertrand Russell. Baggini haal Russell soos volg aan: "The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it" (p 137).
Ek gaan nie ’n vergelykende studie van Blackburn en Baggini se tekste onderneem nie. Ek gaan ook nie poog om ’n oorsig van laasgenoemde se boek te gee nie. Ek gaan bloot die aandag op enkele aspekte van Baggini se werk vestig. Anders as met die fisiese uitleg, het ek geen noemenswaardige kritiek op die inhoud nie. Heel voor in die boek skryf Baggini: "Philosophy is like fish: best presented without too much adornment, hard to get just right, and easy to ruin." Later: "We do philosophy whenever we rationally reflect on the nature, purpose, meaning, justification or value of some general aspect of the world" (p 11).
Aanvanklik was alle empiriese kennis deel van die wysbegeerte. Mettertyd het die areas van sekerder kennis as natuurfilosofie bekend gestaan. Een na die ander het die wetenskappe hulle as kennisgebiede onder hulle eie name buite die wysbegeerte gevestig. Hedendaagse eksperimentele filosofie (p 69) bevind hom op ’n gebied tussen die wysbegeerte en die wetenskappe. Streng gesproke begeef die wysgeer hom tradisioneel nie in die wetenskap nie, maar doen hy wel uitsprake oor die wetenskap.
Let op hoe knap (omvattend dog kernagtig) skryf Baggini oor aspekte van hedendaagse "wetenskaplike" kennis, waaroor daar groot ongedurigheid (ook by my) bestaan: "Metaphysics often seems speculative and inconclusive, but then so does much contemporary physics. Physicists debate whether we live in just one of an infinite number of multiverses; whether the universe will expand forever or eventually collapse; whether quantum theory shows that causation is truly probabilistic or whether it is deterministic but unknowable; whether quantum theory and general relativity can be reconciled by the postulate that matter is fundamentally composed of one-dimensional strings; and so on. The distinction between sober, hard science and extravagant, speculative philosophy appears to be at the very least blurred, if not entirely illusory" (p 57).
Oor religie: "There are a number of religious impulses: for community, for meaning, for myths to live by, for rituals to give shape to life; for a way of thinking about that which transcends the here and now" (p 77). "It is a basic mistake to think that religious texts and credos are making factual statements about the world. They are, rather, pointing to 'spiritual truths'" (p 75). "There are plenty of people who believe the most absurd, literal versions of their various religions" (p 74). "People are generally far too readily taken in by weak arguments that lead to conclusions they like" (p 73). Montaigne het gesê: "Nothing is so firmly believed as that which least is known" (p 136). Hume het geskryf: "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence" (p 141).
Daar is steun vir die opvatting wat ek onlangs in ’n SêNet-reaksie uitgespreek het: "Soul ... is not a thing, but the capacities a living thing has which distinguish it from the non-living" (p 83). "Aristotle's view: soul or self is not a separate thing but is simply what emerges when our parts work together" (p 85). "There is no abiding, enduring self" (p 84). Thomas Metzinger gebruik die frase, "myth of the self" (p 87). ’n Mens se self of ek verander voortdurend. Net die subjek se geheue hou die illusie van ’n enkele deurlopende self in stand. Verwys in hierdie verband na bv Susan Blackmore se Consciousness (2005).
Baggini oor politiek: "Few would be so complacent as to suggest that developed western democracies have got it all right" (p 101). "People who seek power are precisely those we wouldn't want to hold it ... the case against democracy is not just that the people are ignorant. For Aristotle, the key was that democracy undermines the rule of law ... Politics becomes a way of expressing the will of whoever holds power ... decadent forms of government ... pit the interests of one class over another ... [in the case of] democracy the majority against the minority" (p 103). Volgens Aristoteles behoort ons regeer te word deur "the people genuinely best qualified to govern" (p 104).
Van die volgende stelling kan gerus in die plaaslike politiek kennis geneem word: "Portray any human as a flawless saint and it is only a matter of time before we end up becoming disillusioned with the imperfect reality" (p 23). Byvoorbeeld, die bevrydingsteoloog Nico Koopman laat hom eerder deur entoesiasme as intelligensie lei wanneer hy Nelson Mandela se dade "bomenslik" noem (Die Burger, 25 Julie, p 17).
Baggini maak die volgende duidelike onderskeid: "Morality is about the actions we need to do or avoid, or the rules we need to follow, in order to do right by other people, whereas ethics is about what we need to do in order to flourish ourselves" (p 113). "Sympathy or empathy [is] at the heart of morality. Empathy enables us to inhabit the point of view of another" (p 116). "Reason alone could never tell you what you ought to do or want to do" (p 117). Om hierdie rede is Baggini se gevolgtrekking: "Ethics is an untidy business" (p 121). "If you know how we should live you know what it means for a human life to achieve its highest value, to be worth living" (p 129).
Dit bring hom by sy laaste hoofstuk wat handel oor die doel of betekenis van die lewe (alle mense s’n, of letterlik alle lewendes s’n, of alles wat is/bestaan) of my lewe. "'The meaning of life does not exist, if by that we mean a single source of value that makes life worth living" (p 129-130). "The fact that you desire something [God, immortality, etc] does not show that that thing must exist" (p 131). As daar nie ’n enkele (bv metafisiese) singewende bron is nie, dan is dit "fitting to seek the meaning of life in life" (p 129). "Self-understanding is surely a prerequisite for knowing how we should live and what meaning, if any, humans can find in life" (p 81). Ons moet self "positive reasons to live" vind (p 132). "We can find meaning in life in a huge variety of ways" (p 133). "Life is richer when it contains more days that could not be replaced by any other ... Making the most of life ... Inner activity is what really keeps us most alive" (p 134). Hiermee breek hy ’n lansie vir (onder andere, of veral) die filosofie.
Daarmee is ons terug by die eerste paragraaf hierbo. Wysbegeerte/filosofie beteken letterlik nie liefde vir kennis nie, maar liefde vir wysheid. "No matter how many times you come back to the most basic questions and canonical texts, there is something new to learn. As Peter Strawson wrote: 'There is no shallow end to the philosophical pool'" (p 133). Wysbegeerte bevorder insig, maar dit beteken nie dat dit sonder meer al ons probleme oplos nie. "To understand better is valuable even when we cannot understand perfectly" (p 65).
Johannes Comestor
Kommentaar
Johannes,
Wysheid begin met die dien van die Here. Dit is die mens se eie aanspraak op "wysheid" wat al eeue lank verwarring saai - veral vanaf die sogenaade eiewys "wysgere" waarna jy verwys hierbo. Die doel van die lewe bestaan wel - tensy natuurlik, as jy jouself as "niks" en "doelloos" ag. Jy sien, elke mens is Niemand todat hy homself in Christus vind - dan is hy Iemand.
Maar nou ja, jy skryf interessante leesstof hierbo, alhoewel nie blywend nie.
Groete
Dolf