Abstract
This article touches on the features of China’s military base in Djibouti and what some observers regard as the newly created Chinese gateway to Africa. The drivers underlying China’s deeper levels of strategic engagement with Djibouti in particular, and the African continent in general, and possible future developments or trajectories are especially analysed. The article intends to explore China’s strategic objectives and motivations in Djibouti and what could be considered as a mixing of Chinese military and business interests. The article also reflects on whether the base in Djibouti is intended to serve as a further step in Beijing’s global expansion; a step that could lead to the building of more overseas military bases and thus be instrumental in the extension of China’s global sphere of influence. The article finally touches on current theorising and scholarly reflections in international relations as an academic discipline on how to understand China’s growing engagement with the African continent.
The article’s point of departure is that while China and Djibouti have had diplomatic relations since 1979, China has deepened its footprint in that small African country in the past decade. In this regard, Beijing has firmly established its presence in Djibouti through multiple multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects of which a military support base has been the most notable project. As far as the base is concerned, a 36-hectare military facility has been developed since 2017 to host several thousand Chinese troops and provide facilities for ships, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Until recently, these types of development on the African continent have not attracted much international attention, but China’s slow and patient approach has increasingly been noticed internationally and is raising questions among many scholars and analysts, especially in the United States of America (USA) and Europe.
Following the above background, the article argues that China’s military footprint in Africa at large and Djibouti in particular cannot be divorced from this emerging superpower’s geo-economic interests in the African continent. It is commonly known that the Chinese economy averaged an annual growth rate of 10 per cent for three decades until 2010. This required the Chinese government to secure substantial levels of energy in order to sustain the momentum of economic growth. In this context, China and Africa have developed and strengthened their economic ties over the past two decades. In fact, in 2009, China became sub-Saharan Africa’s single largest trading partner as the rapid economic growth and expanding middle class in China boosted its demand for raw materials. Many of these raw materials come from Africa, and this has been a very important factor in growing trade links between China and Africa. For its part, China exports machinery, equipment of various kinds and manufactured goods to Africa.
A global Chinese project that is strongly linked to Chinese investment in Africa is President Xi Jingping’s development framework, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the One Belt, One Road Initiative. This project was launched in 2013 and is aimed at developing an economic belt and a maritime road to promote cooperation between and the interconnection of major markets in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa. The BRI is widely viewed as a uniquely ambitious infrastructure project that is aimed at strengthening China’s business interests in several regions – including Africa – and as an important framework for exercising China’s soft power. The BRI as a modern-day Maritime Silk Road has gained increasing prominence in Chinese policymaking and economic planning and involves several state and business actors from a number of countries in the relevant regions. The BRI underpins and explains China’s investment of billions of dollars in new rail, shipping and airport infrastructure in dozens of countries, including Djibouti.
The article also reflects on China’s geo-strategic and military interests. Of particular interest is the fact that the Chinese government is justifying its base in Djibouti as a facility to contribute to humanitarian relief, peace and stability in Africa. This relates to China’s efforts to bring more stability to the African continent, which can also be seen in Beijing’s expanding (military) role in international peacekeeping operations. China is currently listed among the world’s 12 largest contributors of international peacekeeping troops, and most of China’s increased peacekeeping activity relates to its involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in African states. Beijing has also stated that the base in Djibouti will be used as a facility to undertake maritime counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to which China has been a regular multinational contributor since 2008. What is striking about Beijing’s public diplomacy is that China has always downplayed the military aspect of the Djibouti base, but instead calls the base a support facility for replenishing the Chinese navy and meeting international obligations in relation to peace and stability in Africa.
In a broad international context the article points out that China keeps pushing for international acknowledgement as a leading global power through its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. In this regard, China is providing far more peacekeepers than any of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus burnishes its image as a concerned international stakeholder. Altogether this puts China in a position to grow its influence in the global political and security landscape, and its base in Djibouti is thus instrumental in advancing Beijing’s growing global economic and military profile.
China has never before established a base far from its so-called near beyond. For this reason the Djibouti project, however modest, tends to fuel perceptions globally that China is deliberately broadening its international military footprint. As much as the Chinese Foreign Ministry is arguing that facilities in Djibouti will be used for logistical support and personnel recuperation of the People’s Liberation Army conducting peacekeeping operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast, many observers suspect or maintain that the project is more ambitious than Beijing is letting on. In the USA several security functionaries and observers are convinced that China’s large-scale build-up, especially in the South China Sea, and global infrastructure investments, such as the Djibouti base, are indicative of a plan for global domination.
From a theoretical point of view, a considerable number of especially American scholarly views can be linked to the theoretical construct of neorealism, also known as structural realism. Over time, numerous articles have been published by academics, researchers and observers that advance the notion of Chinese power projection and even a Chinese threat in Africa. Authors of these works basically argue that the unfolding global political economy is paired with China’s growing might and power projection in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the African continent, and that this is posing a growing challenge to the USA. However, scholars with an opposing view contend that the above-mentioned researchers, analysts and observers are too often simply jumping on an ideological bandwagon, and argue that China is actually not that different from Western powers in the 20th century in terms of pursuing realistic objectives within the paradigm of power and national interest. They further argue that theorising in international relations in the USA and Europe is often too focused on a history of Western dominance, which is producing problems when applied to contemporary Sino-Africa-relations.
In light of the above arguments, this article holds that the broader picture of Sino-Africa relations suggests that China’s interest in African affairs goes beyond mere altruism – although actors in Africa are also reaping economic benefit from China’s engagement with Africa. Among others, Chinese companies are getting into new business ventures, and the Chinese economy is gaining steady access to much-needed natural resources, while Chinese development assistance has created many roads, bridges, railways, schools and hospitals in African states. In this context it should specifically be noted that Djibouti has benefitted considerably from its growing friendship and collaboration with China. The strategic arrangement between the two countries is much more than the establishment of a military base, in the sense that it strengthens Djibouti’s position as a key entry point on the eastern parts of the African continent, in addition to the substantial infrastructural development by China in this small country.
In the final analysis, and on the whole, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the Chinese move to establish a permanent naval presence in Djibouti is strongly driven by both geo-economic and geo-strategic motivations. This means that China’s actions in Djibouti fit squarely into the wider context of Beijing’s post-Cold War economic interests and military activities in the sense that the naval base will be aimed mainly at serving business purposes, but also boost the Chinese navy in projecting power and serving other military interests. The article also argues that China is notably the most significant external actor in Djibouti and that this small country can be seen as a microcosm of China’s engagement with and endeavours on the African continent. This engagement reflects all of the benefits, drawbacks and controversies relating to Beijing’s political, economic and military footprint on the African continent at large, as well as current international security dynamics in which China’s global sphere of influence is increasingly spreading.
Keywords: China; China Africa relations; China’s military interests; China’s port to Africa; military base in Djibouti.