Abstract
How do we deal with a difficult – or worse still, a damning – past? The recent uproar about the statue of Cecil John Rhodes and related “colonial” images and symbols illustrates how vibrant memory can be and how strongly it affects current debates – long after these events were supposed to have been relegated to the past. The critical question is how memories of this kind influence present realities and impact on future developments. In this respect a lesser-known essay with the title Kann gestern besser werden? (“Can yesterday become better?”) by the cultural historian Jörn Rüsen offers insights worthy of further exploration. According to Rüsen we are dealing with the contrast between experience and interpretation – a paradox giving rise to two opposing responses: a modern and a post-modern approach. The former follows the “scientific” route and wants to determine – à la Leopoldt von Ranke (1975) – what reallyhappened to arrive at critically tested and objective, reliable knowledge. The latter takes the present as the point of departure, accepting that all knowledge about the past exists only in mediated form, having already undergone a process of interpretation. Since this “linguistic turn”, the nature of historiography has changed for many historians, making the concept of “objective” knowledge a problematic one.
Rüsen does not accept that the two approaches are mutually exclusive, but understands the contrast as the driving force behind the rapidly expanding memory discourse. The latter requires both the “cold” methodology of scientific historiography and the “warm” activity of collective memory. In order to make sense of history, the “facts” alone do not suffice. At the same time, memory will lose its ability to provide orientation if the past is merely fiction. But for successful sense-making, a change of perspective is needed: instead of taking the past as the point of departure, the future possibilities of memory should be explored. In this way the surplus meaning of historical events is released that can make yesterday become “better”. Rüsen takes his cue from an exchange between two of the main characters in the Peanuts cartoon. In one sequence, Linus and Charlie Brown are contemplating life. Linus then asserts, “I guess it’s wrong always to be worrying about tomorrow. Maybe we should think only about today …” After a long silence Charlie responds: “No, that’s giving up … I’m still hoping that yesterday will get better.”
For Rüsen, this longing is related to what the Founding Fathers called the “pursuit of happiness”. This was more than satisfying personal needs, but rather bringing a harrowing past and a history of neglect and injustice to a better conclusion – to a life of liberty and independence.
What would it imply if historical thinking is likewise understood as a “pursuit of happiness”? First, the past cannot be explored in isolation and only for its own sake, but must be considered in a wider context. However terrifying a specific experience may be, it is the duty of historical thinking to place the single occurrence in context and to relate it to a wider constellation of events. Following Burkhardt and Von Ranke, Rüsen argues that searching for the “inner cohesion” of events offers the key to getting beyond a negative past. On the surface it may appear as if the powerful always triumphs over the powerless, but the challenge is to discover the deeper meaning of history. This requires that the past be complemented by perspectives from the present and from the future. Sense and experience thus combine to make a deeper level of understanding possible. The factualness of events is not disputed, but placed in a wider context.
The ability to provide comprehensive orientation is, for Rüsen, one of the great advantages of historical thinking. This is one way in which yesterday can become better. But it does not end merely with insight. Historical understanding inevitably leads to action – the past thus becomes what he calls “handlungszielkompatibel”, that is, guiding one’s actions in a goal-oriented way.
The focus on action signals an important shift in Rüsen’s argument. His concept of the future unavoidably becomes teleologicalin nature. Historical understanding has motivational consequences. The future perspective it opens is aimed at achieving a specific goal. According to Rüsen, historical thinking always had this teleological intention, even if the subject of what was to be achieved by history differed over time: God, society, culture, the nation, or a specific class.
However, the future envisaged by this teleological approach is not unproblematic. It is not completely open, but under a certain “discipline” of the past. At the same time Rüsen is well aware of the danger of “master narratives” and the idea that historical events are the inevitable result of a predetermined plan. For him, the discipline of the past consists in tradition (that which stood the test of time), examples or figures to emulate, choices to avoid, or a critical historical consciousness. He therefore looks for “trans-narrative criteria” to support his goal- and action-oriented understanding of history. But it is exactly these attempts at a “meta”-understanding of history that in the past so often degenerated into tales of self-glorification and the demonising of others. Even worse: it could lead to forms of theodicy or the justification of the injustices of the past.
How convincing is Rüsen’s plea for a “better” yesterday? His great merit is the consistently future-oriented nature of his thinking. The possibility of yesterday becoming better rests squarely on the premise that yesterday does not belong merely to the past, but that it co-determines the present and has a decisive influence on our actions in the future. In addition, he gives a far wider scope to memory than merely remembering – it includes the whole process of sense-making of the present and our anticipation of the future.
At the same time there are certain deficiencies in his proposal. On the one hand he goes too far, on the other hand not far enough. He goes too far by opting for a teleological concept of the future and he does not apply a future perspective consistently when dealing with the past. The second part of the article is an attempt to continue the conversation with Rüsen and to offer two alternative approaches.
The first alternative concerns a more suitable concept of the future when dealing with a negative past. A teleological approach has distinct drawbacks. Its classic formulation comes from Droysen (1977:435), who sees history as the fulfilment of goal after goal, moving inexorably towards a “goal of goals” in which movement is perfected and all becomes rest. He even does not hesitate to talk of a “theodicy of history”. Rüsen follows this line of thinking, but clearly recognises the dynamic nature of history and, in contrast to Droysen, wants to keep the future open. He is aware of the dangers of master narratives that threaten this openness and is consequently forced to distinguish between a “practical” and a “theoretical” teleology, which is not very convincing.
Another alternative (to which Rüsen also refers) is a utopian understanding of the future. This approach has the advantage that it is clearly future-oriented and that it promises a better dispensation. However, on closer examination it is even less suitable for our purpose. The main problem is the delinking from the past. The alternative that the utopia offers is an alternative to the present and not a way to deal with the past. At the same time, the utopia is uncoupled from the present, in the sense that the present offers no restrictions on how utopia is envisaged, This temporal discontinuity with past and present means that utopian ideals are placed outside the stream of historical events, which renders it incapable of helping to salvage a negative past.
A third approach would be an apocalyptic view of the future. Here the dominant consciousness is one of crisis, but its focal point is the present. Although the concept implies a dynamic understanding of history, it is beset by three problems. First, it expects a drastically different future, but this future is not open – the end result is already determined. Secondly, the future is proleptically drawn into the present not to change it, but to judge it, and thirdly, the basic mood is pessimistic, even fatalistic. The new heaven and the new earth presuppose the destruction of the existing – there is no continuity with the past or the “improvement” of the past.
The most suitable approach would be an eschatological view of the future. Here present and future stand in a dynamic tension with the great advantage that it enables a consistent thinking from the future backwards to the present and the past. It is further associated with attributes like an emphasis on hope, the tension between promise and fulfilment, a positive attitude towards the future, the ability to endure adversity and suffering, the dealing with trauma, the propensity to forgive, the willingness to reconcile and to accept change. It functions within a horizon of expectation with, at the same time, a critical consciousness of present realities. It enables the sense-making of historical events and generates positive expectations of the future.
The second deficiency in Rüsen’s approach is the vague and often contradictory way in which he applies a future perspective to memory. Despite his insistence on a motivating use of memory he has to concede that people mostly do not achieve the anticipated “happy end” of history. More effective would be an approach which consistently explores the future potential of negative experiences and memories. For this, a one-dimensional attachment to the past must be liberated to consider its potential future(s). This potential can range from negative expressions (“never again!”) to positive commitments. This enables a change of rhetoric (from blame and justification to reaching out) and the regaining of agency (from victim to subject). The angel of Paul Klee is rightly terrified by the past, but what would happen if, for once, he were to turn around and face the future?
Keywords: historical memory, historiography, Jörn Rüsen, future-oriented memory