Wanneer ’n mens met ander standpunte gekonfronteer word, kan dit tot "cognitive contamination" lei (p 31). Dit gee op sy beurt aanleiding tot bewustheid van "cognitive dissonance, meaning information that contradicts previously held views" (p 32). Daarna kan "cognitive defense", "cognitive bargaining" en "cognitive compromise" volg (p 33). Wat religie betref, is "interfaith dialogue" wenslik (p 38). Dit is nie nodig dat oor alles eenstemmigheid bereik word nie. Daar is "adiaphora", dus "things that don't make a difference" (p 40).
Fundamentalisme word as ’n reaktiewe, moderne (dus na-Middeleeuse) verskynsel voorgestel. "Fundamentalism is an attempt to restore the taken-for-grantedness of a tradition, typically understood as a return to a (real or imagined) pristine past of the tradition" (p 73). Dan kan twyfel in bv religieuse geledere ’n negatiewe status kry en as sonde geklassifiseer word. "Both extreme uncertainty and extreme certainty are dangerous, though not equally so ... scepticism (doubt as habit ...) is essential to a humanly decent society" (p 87). "Doubt is most common and most prominent as a middle ground ... Knowledge can foster unbelief, and ignorance can foster belief or faith ... The middle ground of all this is doubt – a basic uncertainty that isn't prepared to let itself be crushed by belief or unbelief, knowledge or ignorance" (p 106).
Hoewel veral religie as voorbeeld van fundamentalisme en fanatisme gebruik word, kom hierdie verskynsels op alle lewensterreine voor. "One of doubt's primary functions is to defer judgment. Doubt is particularly opposed to hasty judgment, prejudgment and prejudice" (p 121). Maar twyfel moet nie oordryf word nie. "It's indeed possible to make moral judgments in an attitude of certainty. That clearly places a limit on doubt" (p 137). "Doubt needs sound rationality to keep it under control" (p 123). Dit gaan om ’n ewewigtige benadering. "The highest praise of doubt is when it itself is subject to doubt" (p 145). "Those who resist fanaticism need to do so without becoming fanatics themselves" (p 148).
Die outeurs verwys na die Europese Unie se verbod op die doodstraf: "The dignity of man is inviolate" (p 129). Dit is soortgelyk aan Trevor Manuel se irrasionele standpunt dat alle menselewens ewe veel waarde het (SêNet, 6.05.2011). Myns insiens kom dit neer op ’n soort eendersverklaring van mense wat betwyfel kan (of moet) word. In die konteks van die Holocaust word gesê: "I can avoid such empathy ... if I can manage to deny the victim the status of someone with whom I have a relationship of reciprocity ... I then deny the victim's status as a potential 'significant other' - indeed, sometimes, in extreme cases, deny the status of a human being" (p 134). As "victim" met "murderer" vervang word, is dit myns insiens moontlik om in die konteks van moraliteit en met verwysing na bv van ons hedendaagse grusame plaas- en ander moorde die menslikheid van die moordenaars te betwyfel.
In die konteks van die ontwikkelde, Westerse lande skryf die outeurs: "The democratic political system should not be subjected to doubt" (p 143). Gelukkig voeg die outeurs met groot realisme by: "One can legitimately wonder if an economically and technologically underdeveloped country is ripe for the democratic system. Democratism can easily be counterproductive and exacerbate situations of underdevelopment, corruption, poverty, and misery. Many postcolonial countries in Africa demonstrate political, economic, and sociocultural disasters brought about by democratism" (p 143). "Power is corrupting, which is why bastards tend to head governments" (p 155). Die parlement kan "an applause machine" word (p 155). Wat nodig is, is veeleer "an ethic of responsibility" (p 159) as ’n etiek van menseregte. Met klaarblyklike verwysing na die hedendaagse Europa word gesê: "People should have the right to preserve their family heritage – language, religion, mores. But is should also be clear that a society has the right to maintain its indigenous, historical culture and that newcomers, if they wish to become part of that society, should affirm a definite degree of loyalty to the indigenous culture" (p 163). In die nuwe Suid-Afrika, daarenteen, behoort ons Europese erfenis myns insiens in groter mate erken en waardeer te word.
Johannes Comestor