Abstract
Regarding the decision of the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) to come to the negotiating table at the end of the 1980s, Battersby (1993) writes: “A compromise agreement on coalition government stems from a recognition by the African National Congress that it has failed to topple the white regime by force and the government’s realization that it can no longer rule alone.” Increasing international and local pressure on the NP, coupled with the capitulation of the primary funder on the ANC’s side, placed both parties in a situation where negotiation made more sense than any other alternative. The main outcomes of these negotiations, involving various groups and parties besides the NP and ANC, were the 1993 Interim Constitution, the first democratic election of 1994, and the 1996 Constitution. The outgoing government placed a high premium on the process and outcome of this grand compromise, considering the results as a guarantee for long-term peace and security. For the ANC and its allies, however, it was not all that clear cut.
Although the 1996 Constitution was the result of multiparty discussions, with the ANC playing a central role in its drafting and acceptance, some principles central to this Constitution and the entire process of compromise were in direct opposition to the principles of the ANC’s internal ideological belief, known since at least 1969 as the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Marsh and Stoker (2010:10) point out that political sciences, like other social sciences, involve exploratory action to understand rather than seeking causal and repeatable results through experimentation. This article has a reflective nature, and aims to comprehend South African politics at the level of base values. Methodologically, a literature study has been conducted, whereby statements from politicians and negotiators involved in the development of the 1996 Constitution and the National Democratic Revolution were used as primary sources. This literature study aims to produce three extensive conceptualizations, making this exploratory study both an independent, standalone article and a starting point for further study of, among other things, the influence of the work of Lenin on Joe Slovo and other ANC/SACP members. Secondary sources analysing international and South African politics over the past century will subsequently be used to evaluate and illuminate these primary sources.
The values on which the Constitution and NDR have respectively been built, where they are clearly evident and obviously unambiguous, have been drawn from these primary sources, while the analysis builds on what has already been published about them. These values are tested from various angles, with as much political balance as the sources allow. Ultimately, these values become part of the descriptions presented.
The article aims to answer the overarching question of whether the political compromise on which South Africa has up to now been built, is failing – this question comprises both the question and goal of the research. In order to reach a fair and just conclusion, it must first be determined what political compromise is and whether the 1996 Constitution is in fact the product of political compromise. Once this has been presented and defended, the next task of the research is to indicate that tension is in fact acting on this compromise, tension that has the NDR as fountainhead. Finally it will be argued that the political compromise is faltering under the identified tension, in this case, the NDR.
As confusion often occurs at the conceptual level, the main thrust of this article is devoted to the conceptualization of political compromise, to demonstrate when such a compromise has failed, followed by extensive analyses of the NDR and the 1996 Constitution.
With regards to its findings, after having undertaken the abovementioned conceptualisation and argumentation, the article argues that the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) can sometimes make temporary concessions without losing sight of its ultimate goal. Such temporary concessions are part and parcel of the Leninist approach of measuring the resistance and reacting to the prevalent balance of power. The role of the African National Congress (ANC), guided by the NDR, is shown to have become vanguard, meaning that it seeks to advance the revolution rather than assume the role of a government when the two options are in conflict. By referring to practical examples, it is argued that the agreed-upon principles of compromise, and the Constitution that resulted from it, are often abandoned when in conflict with the aspirations of the revolution.
In conclusion it is argued that the compromise at the base of the South African democratic project is flawed. To facilitate a mostly peaceful transition from the apartheid system to a democratic South Africa, a compromise was reached during a preceding negotiation process. This compromise took the form of a list of principles – agreed-upon values upon which consensus was reached. The principles agreed upon during this compromise became the foundation upon which order in a democratic South Africa would be built. The central question this article grapples with is the state of the political compromise, and consequently, the state of these principles in the South African political arena. The assumption being tested is that the ANC alliance is primarily guided by the idea of the National Democratic Revolution and that the agreed-upon principles are abandoned when in tension with the NDR. By examining the development and character of both the NDR and the 1996 Constitution, examples of inherent tension could be identified. It is further demonstrated that in cases of such tension, the ANC alliance prioritizes the NDR over the principles of compromise embodied in the Constitution.
These findings imply that order largely rests on a Constitution that is not the primary guiding directive for those who must implement it. The implication is that the integrity of the compromise is fundamentally flawed because the values that should serve as the fulcrum of the compromise continually, as demonstrated, succumb to other values. These values engage with society in a revolutionary manner, and the mechanisms of government are employed to imprint these revolutionary values onto the state.
Keywords: 1996 Constitution; African National Congress (ANC); Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF); National Democratic Revolution (NDR); National Party (NP)
Lees die volledige artikel in Afrikaans
’n Mislukte kompromie? Die 1996-Grondwet onder spanning van die Nasionale Demokratiese Rewolusie