China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) is designed to enhance China’s geostrategic position through coalition-building with partners that align with Chinese principles regarding international security and domestic law enforcement. Introduced by President Xi Jinping in 2022, the GSI represents one among several initiatives intended to reshape global governance structures in a manner favourable to China’s resurgence as a major power.
Although the initiative is presented as a framework prioritising collaborative security, non-interference and support for the United Nations Charter – principles that resonate strongly in Africa and across the developing world – it remains fundamentally rooted in Chinese conceptions of national security. The GSI Concept Paper, released in 2023, should be considered alongside the “2025 White Paper on China’s National Security”, which articulates these connections within the broader context of the four pillars of Chinese national security:
- Political (regime) security as the foundation
- Economic security as the base
- Military science, technology, culture and social security as the guarantee
- International security as the supporting structure
Initially characterised by general and ambiguous language, the GSI is progressively acquiring more defined contours. At the Ninth Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, President Xi identified the FOCAC 2025-2027 Action Plan as an “example of early GSI implementation”. Subsequently, eight high-level China-Africa military exchanges occurred between September 2024 and the Interministerial FOCAC Implementation Meeting in June 2025, including a programme hosted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army Command College in Nanjing for 90 early career officers from 40 African countries.
As the GSI becomes further integrated into China-Africa relations, it directly shapes China’s security cooperation activities on the continent. For instance, the FOCAC Action Plan set forth a target to train 6 000 senior and 500 early career African military officers, as well as 1 000 police officers, by September 2027, ahead of the next FOCAC Summit.
Some African thought leaders have voiced concerns about the potential adoption of certain aspects of the GSI, such as absolute ruling party control over “national security work”. For African governments, perceived advantages of engaging with the GSI include enhanced access to economic aid, infrastructure financing and affordable, less regulated security equipment. Furthermore, certain leaders share China’s emphasis on regime security and continuity, sometimes privileging these over citizen-focused security.
On the other hand, certain African commentators highlight the dangers of embracing elements of the GSI that may undermine established norms of democratic civil-military relations and the principle that security professionals serve constitutional objectives rather than partisan interests. Such concerns are informed by the continent’s historical experiences with authoritarian one-party or military rule.
There are also apprehensions that deeper engagement with the GSI may draw African states into broader geopolitical rivalries, as countering Western influence remains central to GSI narratives and strategy. This could potentially erode Africa’s longstanding commitment to nonalignment.
Unpacking the GSI
The GSI is one of three major efforts to reshape the international order, alongside the Global Development Initiative (GDI), focused on development assistance, and the Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI), which introduces alternative global norms. These are detailed in China’s 2023 White Paper, “A global community of shared future”.
The GSI is anchored by six principles: common and cooperative security, respect for sovereignty, adherence to the UN Charter, consideration of all countries’ security concerns, resolution through dialogue, and attention to both traditional and nontraditional security. These principles especially appeal to developing countries, reinforcing China’s position as a leader among the Global South nations.
The GSI emphasises “indivisible security” and mutual respect for legitimate interests, and discourages undermining others. This approach supports territorial and regime security claims, with African states often backing China’s positions, including on issues like the South China Sea and the One China policy.
Protecting Chinese overseas interests is central to the GSI, with security for investments and nationals prioritised through partnerships with host nations and Chinese security firms – an emphasis featured in action plans across China’s regional forums.
China established the Global Security Initiative Center to oversee GSI implementation, highlighting the role of regional blocs in promoting GSI concepts and identifying 20 priority cooperation areas.
The GSI is being integrated within platforms such as FOCAC, where African endorsements began in 2022 and have since expanded. GSI themes now feature in bilateral agreements and military/security programmes, mirroring similar mainstreaming efforts in other Chinese-led organisations. FOCAC serves as a key channel for GSI-related cooperation, facilitating targeted security hardware provision and financial allocations for peace and security initiatives tied to the GSI, thereby boosting China’s strategic influence across Africa and beyond.
China is engaging with established organisations such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations to seek legitimacy and international support for the GSI, aiming to shape security discourse beyond its immediate regional affiliations. For example, China has utilised its contributions to the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund to provide security-related assistance predominantly to Global South countries, including for counterterrorism initiatives. Established in 2016, following a Chinese pledge to commit $200 million to the United Nations over ten years, the agency serves as one of China’s major channels for such support. Nevertheless, attempts to incorporate explicit GSI terminology into United Nations documents have met limited success.
African perspectives on Chinese security cooperation and the GSI
Certain African governments view the GSI as a supplementary source of security support within resource-constrained environments, while others express reservations regarding its potential policy consequences and associated risks. These concerns often stem from apprehensions about aspects of China’s security governance model, such as its focus on regime stability and party dominance over the armed forces, which may not align with African contexts. While many African governments uphold the principle of an apolitical military, a primary concern remains that the nature and intensity of China’s security engagement might entrench the opposite. This risk is heightened where Chinese security governance models resonate with ruling parties in Africa. As noted by Africa-China commentator Amodani Gariba, “By using the military to decimate the opposition, ruling parties in some sub-Saharan African countries have effectively created one-party states.” Although China’s economic cooperation has yielded substantial benefits for Africa, the expansion into military collaboration could exacerbate existing governance challenges.
Additional issues relate to China’s increased export of domestic security products, such as sophisticated policing equipment and surveillance systems, corresponding with the advancement of the GSI. Bulelani Jili, an expert in the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems in Africa, cautions that China’s approach – favouring state actors over the private sector and civil society – raises substantive concerns in both authoritarian and democratic settings. At the same time, Jili acknowledges the demand from African governments seeking these technologies and recommends enhanced regulatory oversight to prevent misuse. Gordon Moyo, director of the Public Policy Research Institute of Zimbabwe, metaphorically remarks, “Technology is like bees whose mouths have a sting and honey. We need to understand the honey we get from China and the sting that digital technologies from China give Africa, because this has a visible impact on civil liberties.”
Some African analysts advocate proactive management of security relationships with China to mitigate adverse effects. Lungani Hlongwa suggests that opportunities will depend on whether African nations can exercise greater agency: “(African stakeholders) can set the agenda by articulating their most pressing security concerns and defining the specific roles they want China to play.”
Ambiguous framing with concrete implications
Though the GSI is presented through broad security concepts intended to maximise appeal, its implementation increasingly involves tangible measures that integrate Chinese security institutions and programmes into African partner countries’ security sectors.
As a central component of China’s global strategic posture, the GSI is expected to remain pivotal within Chinese foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Its development in Africa will likely anticipate – and reflect – its broader deployment in other regions as part of China’s global security strategy. Mechanisms such as FOCAC and various regional coordination platforms will continue to play essential roles in these efforts.
The GSI presents notable implications for African domestic security norms and practices, further aligning African countries with China amid its geostrategic competition with Western powers. To address potential risks and protect African interests, it is important for local stakeholders to assess the implementation of the GSI critically. Such scrutiny should foster ongoing national and continental dialogue regarding its perceived advantages and disadvantages, alongside consideration of alternative approaches to security that are consistent with Africa's traditions of nonalignment and accountable governance in service of its citizens.
Bibliography
Arase, D. 2024. China’s Global Security Initiative: Narratives, origins and implications. UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jash, A. 2025. Africa pivots to China’s Global Security Initiative. 3 March. https://www.orfonline.org/research/africa-pivots-to-china-s-global-security-initiative (Accessed 1 September 2025).
Matthews, W. 2025. Security with Chinese characteristics: How the Global Security Initiative reflects Beijing’s priorities at home. 13 May. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/security-chinese-characteristics-how-global-security-initiative-reflects-beijing-s (Accessed 29 August 2025).